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Andrzej Wawryniuk
(Państwowa Wyższa Szkoła Zawodowa w Chełmie)
ORCID 0000-0002-2555-1488

The Shaping of the Eastern Polish Border Along the Section with Ukraine as one of the Factors Influencing on the Post-War European System

Annotation: In this article, the author discusses political decision-making by the then three great powers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States and the United Kingdom. The period of time of the discussed problem includes the years 1941 (Sikorski-Majski Agreement) to 1945. (Potsdam Conference), which were of key importance for the formation of the Ukrainian-Polish border and were one of the elements of the changing political system in Europe at that time.

Keywords: Tehran, Yalta, Potsdam, the Great Three, Poland, Ukraine, border, agreement.

Kształtowanie się wschodniej granicy Polski wzdłuż odcinka z Ukrainą jako czynnik wpływający na powojenny system europejski

Streszczenie: W artykule autor omawia decyzje polityczne Wielkiej Trójki: Związku Socjalistycznych Republik Radzieckich, Stanów Zjednoczonych i Wielkiej Brytanii w okresie od 1941 (Umowa Sikorski – Majski) do 1945 r. (Konferencja Poczdamaska), które miały kluczowe znaczenie dla utworzenia granicy ukraińsko-polskiej i były jednym z elementów zmieniającej się polityki dotyczącej powojennego porządku w Europie.

Słowa kluczowe: granica, Jałta, Poczdam, Teheran, Wielka Trójka, Polska, Ukraina, stosunki międzynarodowe.

Формирование восточной границы Польши вдоль участка с Украиной как фактор, влияющий на послевоенную европейскую систему

Аннотация: В статье автор обсуждает политические решения Большой тройки: Союза Советских Социалистических Республик, Соединенных Штатов Америки и Соединенного Королевства в период с 1941 года (Соглашение Сикорски-Майский) до 1945 года (Потсдамская конференция), которые имели ключевое значение для создания украинско-польской границы и были одним из элементов изменяющейся

политики в отношении послевоенного порядка в Европе.

Ключевые слова: граница, Ялта, Потсдам, Тегеран, Большая тройка, Польша, Украина, международные отношения.

The research connected with the implementation of the topic presented was conducted as one of the elements of scientific research of the formation of the Polish eastern border. In this case, the focus was directed to the section with Ukraine – one of the elements of the political system of the new, post-war Europe.

Publications related to the subject of the article are very scarce. Apart from the monograph of the author of this publication – “Granica wschodnia Polski po 1944 roku (na odcinku z Ukrainą)”, there are no publications of the sort. In writing of this paper the following publications, among others, were used: Longin Pastusiak – “Roosevelt a sprawa polska”; Włodzimierz Kowalski – “Poczdamski ład pokojowy”; “Teheran, Jałta, San Francisco, Poczdam”; “Teheran Jałta Poczdam”; Andrzej Albert – “Wschodnie granice Polski”; Jacek Ślusarski – “Polityka rządu generała W. Sikorskiego wobec ZSRR”; Piotr Żaroń – “Kierunek wschodni w strategii wojskowo-politycznej gen. Władysława Sikorskiego 1940-1943”; and Eugeniusz Duraczewski – “Rząd Polski na Uchodźstwie 1939-1945”.

The subject and target of the scientific research was to explain and show the mechanisms of political decision-making by the current superpowers of local and global significance. Other scholarly publications have been used in addition to archival documents from New Records Archive, the Sikorski Institute and Museum in London and the Józef Piłsudski Institute in New York.

The post-war borders of Ukraine and Poland were created as a result of decisions made by the leaders of United Soviet Socialist Republic, United Kingdom and the United States of America. The issues connected with the territory of the Republic of Poland (RP) and its borders after 1939 appeared after the beginning of the Soviet-German war in 1941. The new political situation was immediately utilized by Great Britain.

It is important to explain here that the opinion of the British government concerning the course of the Eastern border of Poland has been known at least since 1941 and was in line with Joseph Stalin’s expectations. As proof of this, the political pressure exerted by Churchill on General Władysław Sikorski, Prime Minister of the Polish Government in Exile (the so-called London Government) in regards to signing of the May-Sikorski Agreement of July 30th 1941¹ can be mentioned, in which, in point 1 it was written that “the Soviet-German treaties of 1939, concerning territorial changes in Poland, have lost their validity”². This was due to the fact that on July 12th, 1941 in Moscow a treaty was signed to ensure combining efforts against Germany by Soviet and British governments. The agreement was signed, in the presence of Generalissimus Stalin³, by Vyacheslav Molotov, the foreign affairs minister of the USSR and

¹ T. Wyrwa, *Układ Sikorski-Majski*, „Zeszyty Historyczne”, Paris, 1992, s. 198-199.

² Józef Piłsudski’s Institute in New York (JPNJ), Rząd polski na emigracji, sign. 701/9/3, k. 3.

³ P. Eberhard, *Polska granica wschodnia 1939-1945*, Warszawa 1993, p. 94.

Stafford Cripps, the ambassador of the government of His Majesty.⁴ There is one additional argument, which is the fact that during the conversation between Sikorski and Stalin taking place on December 4th in Moscow, Generalissimus said "We surely will not argue about the borders"⁵.

One more important note is that, according to W. Sikorski, USSR Government agreed to increase the numbers of Polish Army in USSR to 90 thousand soldiers; evacuating from USSR 25 thousand land units, independently from 2.000 of Air Force and Marine troops⁶.

In addition to that it has been promised to grant the money needed to sustain the Polish Army and necessary amount of financing (100 million Rubles) for expenses of taking care of Polish citizens unable to work⁷.

Equally important is Kremlin agreeing to recruiting to the Polish Army citizens from regions of pre-war Poland⁸.

It would seem that the opinions, along with appropriate laws guarantee that post-war Poland will remain in the East within the borders from before World War II outbreak.

The Polish government was convinced that, at least with the support of the UK, this was the solution it could count on. The fact that the United States withdrew from the promise as early as July 31st, 1941, arguing that it had signed it without any prior response, was one of the reasons why only the UK were designated as guarantors of Polish interest in the East⁹.

Anthony Eden, the UK Foreign Affairs Minister, referring to the agreement signed, during a conversation with General Władysław Sikorski, said: "I would like to inform you that, according to the decision of the Agreement of Mutual Help between Great Britain and Poland from August 25th, 1939, the government of His Majesty, did not take any commitments regarding the USSR regarding the relations between that country and Poland. I wish to ensure you, that the government of His Majesty does not recognize any territorial changes in Poland since August 1939"¹⁰.

It is worth to mention, that also in July 30th 1941, A. Eden, describing the matter of the signed agreement was responding deputy's questions in the House of Commons, one of which, asked by Deputy Mender, sounded as follows: "In regards to border guarantee, of course the already existing guarantees for Poland still remain valid?", to which Eden replied "No, there aren't any, like I said, border guarantees"¹¹.

⁴ Richard Stafford Cripps, (1889-1952), minister in the government of Winston Churchill.

⁵ New Files Archive (Archiwum Akt Nowych), Hoover Institute Archive, Documents of Władysław Anders, sign. 2, k. 1088.

⁶ New Files Archive (AAN), Hoover Institute Archive, Documents of Władysław Anders, sign. 69, k. 916.

⁷ Ibidem, sygn. 69, k. 916.

⁸ A. A. Wawryniuk, *Granica polsko-sowiecka po 1944 roku (na odcinku z Ukrainą)*, Chełm 2015, p. 89.

⁹ IJPNJ, "Rząd polski na emigracji", sign. 701/9/3, k. 6. Jan Ciechanowski, Ambassador of the Republic of Poland to the United States, held talks on the issue of U.S. guarantees concerning the Eastern borders of Poland in Washington.

¹⁰ Polish General Sikorski's Institute and Museum in London (IPiMSL), Prezydium Rady Ministrów, tzw. Akta J. Żarąńskiego (PRM.Z.), sign. 10, k. 136, 137.

¹¹ J. Ślusarczyk, *Polityka rządu generała W. Sikorskiego wobec ZSRR*, Warsaw 1985, p. 50.

The conclusion of the aforementioned agreement resulted in several outstanding politicians, such as General Kazimierz Sosnkowski and Aleksander Zaleski, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, resigning and the President of the Republic of Poland, Władysław Raczkiewicz, claiming that the agreement had been signed without his power of attorney or consent.

The situation was further exacerbated by the fact that on August 1st, 1941, "The Times", in their introductory article, claimed that "In Central Europe, some leadership must replace the disorganisation of the last twenty years". As it has been written, neither the United Kingdom nor the United States can play such a role in the region "that the German influence cannot eclipse over Russia's interests in Eastern Europe". The article caused concerns even in the distant Turkey, which led to "The Times" explaining on August 6th that the article in question did not refer to a country as big as Turkey, but only to Eastern Europe. In turn, the English ambassador in Turkey was tasked to explain to the local Ministry of Foreign Affairs that "The Times", when writing about Eastern Europe, meant Poland and the Baltic States¹².

Given that the newspaper presented an official position of the British Government, as confirmed by the quoted statement of His Majesty's Ambassador in Ankara, it can be assumed that, - if not yet already accepted, it was intended - it was planned to divide Europe into political influence zones. Even though it was not known yet how the war in Europe would end, the Allies, aware of Hitler's unpredictability in decision making, opted to establish an anti-Hitler alliance with the Soviets (as we can see, sacrificing Poland and its pre-war eastern territories).

General Sikorski and his cabinet were aware of the fact that the Republic of Poland was left alone in its efforts to preserve the Eastern borders of the country, therefore it has sought to attract the attention of the public in various ways. On January 11th, 1942, Edward Raczyński, the head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in his interview with the "The Sunday Times", said that the future of Europe lies in federations, mainly in Central and Eastern Europe, focusing on the Baltic republics, of whose separation from the USSR he opted for¹³.

The position of E. Raczyński was met with a very angry reaction of the Soviet Union, on behalf of which Ambassador Aleksandr Bogomolov presented a note of protest.

This was not the only Polish initiative, which sought, among other things, an agreement with the smaller European states remaining under Third Reich occupation.

The Polish Government - probably realizing the fact that it's being progressively isolated, sought various possibilities of establishing cooperation on the basis of partnership. Such was the case with Czechoslovakia, with which an agreement was signed on January 23rd, 1942, on the principles of the future confederation of the two states. A bit earlier, on January 15th, Greece and Yugoslavia also signed a similar agreement, only this time referring to the Balkan Union. It is notable that both initiatives, according to their signatories, were meant to ensure "the security and

¹² *Układ Sikorski-Majski. Wybór dokumentów*, oprac. E. Duraczyński, Warsaw 1990, p. 51.

¹³ J. Ślusarczyk, op. cit., p. 81.

prosperity of the area between the Baltic and Aegean seas"¹⁴, provided, however, that the cooperation remains well. It comes as no surprise that, in February 1942, General Sikorski, Prime Minister of the Polish Government, had the right to believe that "Poland was actively participating in an effort to establish the world order"¹⁵.

The fragile nature of the alliances at the time is clearly demonstrated by the fact that, on November 12th, 1942, Edvard Beneš, President of Czechoslovakia in exile, declared that "the unclear situation in Central Europe did not allow the Czechoslovak government to make final decisions on the confederation, and that its very creation required communication with the USSR"¹⁶.

There has also been an attempt to gain the support of the United States. To achieve that, among others, minister E. Raczyński resided in the USA, as well as Prime Minister W. Sikorski from March 24th to March 30th, 1942¹⁷. During that time, General Sikorski managed to gain the support of American president Franklin Roosevelt for the presented statement regarding Poland's Eastern borders, which at the time looked drastically different from the one presented by His Majesty's government. Such support was due, among other things, to the fact that the USA has shown little interest in the issues of Central and Eastern Europe and preferred regions with high economic and strategic potential, including the Middle East.

It should be noted that, during this period, Polish Army units were moved from USSR and mass graves of murdered Polish officers in Katyń were discovered. These facts further exacerbated the attitude of the Soviets towards General Sikorski and ultimately, on April 21st, 1943, Moscow broke off its diplomatic relations with London.

Earlier, on April 12th, 1943, during a conversation with the British Prime Minister, the Polish Prime Minister heard that Churchill was in favour of a "timely review of Poland's eastern borders in favour of the Soviet Union, while promising compensation in the West"¹⁸.

Piotr Żaroń, the author of the above quote, wrote in his comment that the unequivocal British stance was a sort of warning to the Polish government to change its stance towards the Soviets and the lands of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus¹⁹.

Most probably, the result of the conversation of April 12th, 1943, was a statement issued by the Polish Government in exile on July 3rd, 1943, on the future Eastern border, in which it was stated that "The Polish-Russian border established in the Treaty of Rome was a sacrifice on the Polish side, because it abandoned the territory on which a significant number of Poles lived, which had received from Poland, over the course of centuries, a huge amount of development and economical effort. Although some adjustments to this border would correspond to the aspirations and needs of the Polish nation, it should be maintained as an expression of the voluntary consent of both parties in order to secure the border"²⁰.

¹⁴ E. Duraczyński, *Rząd Polski na Uchodźstwie 1939-1945*, Warsaw 1993, p. 175.

¹⁵ *Ibidem*, p. 176.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹⁷ J. Ślusarczyk, *op. cit.*, p. 83, 84.

¹⁸ P. Żaroń, *Kierunek wschodni w strategii wojskowo-politycznej gen. Władysława Sikorskiego 1940-1943*, Warsaw 1988, p. 216.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*.

²⁰ IPiMSL, *Dokumenty Prezydium Rady Ministrów*, so called J.Zarański Files, sign. 1, k. 19.

Meanwhile, the National Political Representation formed by the government of the Republic of Poland in exile has been firmed up: The Polish Socialist Party – Freedom Equality Independence, People’s Party, National Party and Labour Party announced, on August 15th, 1943, the “inviolability of the Eastern border”²¹.

It is worth noting that for the first time the Polish Government in London allowed for a discussion on the future Eastern borders of the Republic of Poland and the USSR.

In this political situation, the first serious talks took place in Tehran, with the participation of the Secretary General of the USSR and the President of the Council of Soviet People’s Commissioners, Joseph Stalin, the British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and the President of the United States Franklin Roosevelt.

In preparations for the political summit, the government of Stanisław Mikołajczyk (who became Prime Minister after General Sikorski’s tragic death) sent Churchill and Roosevelt a memorandum justifying Poland’s position on the Eastern borders of Poland²².

Before “The Big Three” discussed this issue, the political situation at the time, including the region of the Pacific Ocean (Japan and China in particular), as well as India, Turkey, Egypt and other countries of Africa and Europe, including the division of Germany, was discussed. For the first time in such an assembly the name of “Ukraine” was spoken of, namely in regards to aggressive German operations to the south and west of Kiev²³. This is important due to the fact that Ukraine was mentioned on the first day of the conference, on November 28th, 1943²⁴.

On December 1st, during a round-table meeting, President Roosevelt raised the issue of Poland, saying “I would like to express the hope that the Soviet Government will be able to start negotiations and re-establish its relations with the Polish Government”, to which Generalissimus Stalin replied “Polish Government agents in Poland are associated with Germany. They are killing guerrillas. You are not able to imagine what they are doing there”²⁵.

Churchill’s voice was also important: It would be good here, at the round table, to learn about Russia’s ideas regarding Polish borders. (...) We believe that Poland, undoubtedly, needs to be compensated at the expense of Germany. We would be ready to tell Poland that this is a good plan and that they cannot expect a better one”²⁶.

No less important was the stance taken by Joseph Stalin on the post-war borders of Poland: “The point is that Ukrainian lands should be returned to Ukraine and Belarussian lands to Belarus, i.e. there should be a border between us and Poland from 1939, established by the Soviet constitution. The Soviet government is on the verge of doing so, and it thinks it right”²⁷.

Stalin’s suggestion has not been commented. It became a silent agreement on the course of the Ukrainian-Polish border after the liberation. According to the sources, “the dispute between Vyacheslav Mokotov and Anthony Eden over the course of the line

²¹ Ibidem, p. 29.

²² A. Albert, *Wschodnie granice Polski*, Warsaw 1984, p. 39.

²³ *Teheran-Jalta-Poczdam*, pub. W. Mensz, Warsaw 1972, p. 13.

²⁴ Ibidem, p. 81

²⁵ Ibidem.

²⁶ Ibidem, p. 83.

²⁷ Ibidem.

and the way in which Lviv was treated was heated", but it did not change the stance of the Soviets²⁸.

In this situation, the "Big Three" agreed to Churchill's proposal and "agreed on setting the Curzon Line and Oder as the borders of the future Poland"²⁹.

At the same time, it stated "that the final demarcation of the border requires careful study and possible resettlement of the population in certain places"³⁰.

An outstanding Polish scholar Włodzimierz Tadeusz Kowalski, justifying the position of Great Britain on the eastern border of the Republic of Poland, wrote that "the Government (of the Republic of Poland in London) will not be able to oppose the position of the great powers in solidarity, and its acceptance of the Curzon Line will deprive Stalin of a critical attitude towards the Polish government in London and will ensure the restoration of diplomatic relations"³¹.

W. Kowalski believed that such a diplomatic move would make it possible to place S. Mikołajczyk Government back in Warsaw and for it to take over political power. Simultaneously, Churchill was afraid that otherwise "Poland would fall out of the capitalistic system"³².

Going back to relations between the Polish Government in exile and the British Government, it is worth noting the talks and their significance, which took place in October 1944 in Moscow, at the British Embassy. They were led by Prime Minister Stanisław Mikołajczyk and Prime Minister Churchill. In addition to the Prime Minister, the Polish side was represented by Minister Tadeusz Romer, Professor Władysław Grabski and Professor Józef Żarański. On the British side, in addition to the Prime Minister, the following speakers took part: Minister Anthony Eden, Ambassador Clark Kerr, Olivier Harley and Denis Allen. From the document that remains after the meeting, the most eloquent exchange of views between prime ministers is contained in a paragraph: "Mikołajczyk: returning to the issue of borders, he states that Stalin declared that the Curzon Line must be the border between Poland and Russia.

Churchill (irritated): I stay out of this as long as I am convinced that we should give up, because of the quarrels with the Poles, we do not intend to squander peace in Europe. You don't see it in your obstinacy. This is not a friendship that we should share. We should tell the world how unreasonable you are. You will start a new war in which 25 million lives will be lost, but you will not dare.

Mikołajczyk: I know that our destiny was sealed in Tehran.

Churchill: It was saved in Tehran.

Mikołajczyk: I am not a person deprived of patriotic feelings to give up half of Poland.

Churchill: What do you mean by saying that you are deprived of patriotic feelings? 25 years ago we renovated Poland, despite the fact that in the last war more Poles fought against us than with us. Now, again, we are fighting to keep you from annihilation and you will not play. You are absolutely crazy"³³.

²⁸ W. Majerski, *Teheran, Jalta, San Francisco, Poczdam*, Warsaw 1987, p. 93.

²⁹ L. Pastusiak, *Roosevelt a sprawa polska*, Warsaw 1980, p. 165.

³⁰ W. Majerski, *op. cit.*, p. 93

³¹ W. T. Kowalski, *Wielka koalicja 1941-1945*, t. I, Warsaw 1980, p. 703

³² *Ibidem*.

³³ IJPUSA, *Rząd Polski na emigracji*, sign. 701/9/16, k. 152. A document with "strictly confidential" classification. The text contained in the paragraph, and in particular the exchange of views between

On October 18th, 1944, Mikołajczyk and Stalin met once again. During the meeting, the Generalissimus, in regards to Prime Minister's proposal to establish a demarcation line, stated: "The demarcation line is not the limit. I decisively insist on the immediate setting of boundaries, which as I used to say, are to run along the line of Curzon. Anyway, when it comes to the Curzon Line, it was not invented by us, but by our allies at that time. It was "good" for the Americans, the French, the English. (...) We cannot withdraw from the Curzon Line. Curzon was our enemy and Clemenceau also. If we were to deviate from this line, we would be ashamed of it. That is why we cannot do it. These areas have always been the subject of clashes and fights between Poles, Belarusians and Ukrainians, and this must end once and for all. Anyway, as far as the Polish people are concerned, they will not oppose this. Representatives of the People's Committee, Bolesław Bierut and Edward Osóbka told me that this new border is a fair one. Finally, a new border line will put an end to the "disputes" between Poles and Ukrainians. This border is opposed by migrants in London, but I do not consider them to be a nation. Anyway, these emigrants are waiting for a conflict between Russia and England. We need a definitive border"³⁴.

The final settlement of the course of Poland's Eastern borders took place during a conference in Yalta (February 4th - 11th, 1945), but it should be noted that, according to Stalin, it was to run along the line. Regardless of this particularity, Marshal Stalin wanted to secure both the eastern and the south-eastern zones of interest at the same time³⁵. The problem of Poland and its borders was, of course, a secondary goal of the conference. However, the main issue which was discussed was that of Germany and its division into zones, which was actually done by deciding that there would be four occupation zones, including, apart from the "Big Three", the French zone, without specifying the specific issues, including the size and boundaries of these zones³⁶. At Stalin's request, the issue

Prime Minister Mikołajczyk, Stalin and Churchill, come from the transcript in the given source. The Polish version of the paragraph reads: Wracając do ówczesnych stosunków pomiędzy Rządem Polski na Uchodźstwie a rządem Wielkiej Brytanii warto zwrócić uwagę na rozmowy i ich wymowę, które odbyły się w październiku 1944 r. w Moskwie, w Ambasadzie Brytyjskiej. Prowadzili je premier Stanisław Mikołajczyk z premierem Churchillem. Stronę polską oprócz premiera reprezentowali: minister Tadeusz Romer, prof. Władysław Grabski i Józef Żarański. Ze strony brytyjskiej, oprócz premiera, udział w rozmowie wzięli: minister Anthony Eden, ambasador Clark Kerr, Olivier Harley i Denis Allen. Z dokumentu, który pozostał po odbytych spotkaniu najbardziej wymowną wymianę zdań pomiędzy premierami zawiera akapit: „Mikołajczyk: powracając do kwestii granic, stwierdza, że Stalin oświadczył, iż Linia Curzona musi być granicą między Polską i Rosją. Churchill: (poirytowany). Umywam ręce tak długo, jak jestem przekonany, że powinniśmy się poddać, ponieważ z powodu kłótni z Polakami my nie zamierzamy zaprzepaścić pokoju w Europie. W swojej upartości nie widzisz tego. To nie jest przyjaźń, którą powinniśmy dzielić. Powinniśmy powiedzieć światu, jaki jesteś nierozsądny. Zacznesz nową wojnę, w której życie straci 25 milionów istnień, ale nie odważysz się. Mikołajczyk: Wiem, że nasze przeznaczenie było przypiętowane w Teheranie. Churchill: Było uratowane w Teheranie. Mikołajczyk: Nie jestem osobą pozbitym patriotycznych uczuć, aby oddać połowę Polski. Churchill: Co masz na myśli mówiąc, że jesteś pozbity patriotycznych uczuć. 25 lat temu my odnowiliśmy Polskę, pomimo tego, że w ostatniej wojnie więcej Polaków walczyło przeciwko nam, niż z nami. Teraz znowu walczymy o to, by zachować was od unicestwienia, a ty nie będziesz grał. Jesteś absolutnie szalony”.

³⁴ Ibidem, k. 426, 427.

³⁵ W. Benz, *Jalta i Poczdam z niemieckiego punktu widzenia*, w: *Jalta, Poczdam – proces podejmowania decyzji*, red. A. Hajnisz, E. Lasota, Warsaw 1996, p. 124.

³⁶ W. Majerski, op. cit., p 132-134.

of Germany's capitulation was also considered, as he feared that it might occur not through the Three Great Powers, but only through the United Kingdom and the United States. Polish affairs were the subject of talks held on 7 February, and the main theses were presented by Joseph Stalin. The six-point formula contained two paragraphs devoted to the borders of the Republic of Poland. These were the points 1 and 2 where Generalissimus proposed:

"(1) recognise that the Polish border in the east should be the Curzon Line with a deviation from it in some regions of 5-6 kilometres in favour of Poland;
2) recognise that the western border of Poland should run from the city of Szczecin (for Poles), then south along the Odra River, and then along the Nisa River (Western)"³⁷.

The United Kingdom and the United States did not comment on the USSR's proposal, which was reflected in the communiqué of the Crimean conference of February 11th, 1945. (Part VI).

In this way, the western borders of Ukraine and Belarus were also determined indirectly. On the same day, the proposal of the Soviet delegation for the participation of 2 or 3 Soviet republics in the group of organizers of international organizations, including Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania, was considered, of which at least two should be considered founding members, which was accepted by Roosevelt and Churchill³⁸.

Summarizing the results of the Crimean conference, we can speak of reaching agreement on the following issues: the occupation and control of Germany, the United Nations conference, the introduction of a new order in Europe, issues related to Poland, including its borders, and issues related to Yugoslavia, and the formation of a government there headed by Marshal Josip Broz Tito. There was also agreement on the Far East.

The reaction of the Polish Government in Exile was negative in relation to the Yalta arrangements, and the statement of February 13th, 1945 stated that "(...) The decisions of the Conference of Three concerning Poland cannot be recognised by the Polish Government and cannot be binding on the Polish Nation. Separating the eastern half of its territory from Poland by imposing the so-called Curzon Line as the Polish-Soviet border, the Polish nation accepts as a new partition of Poland, this time by Poland's allies"³⁹.

Another document states that Yalta was the site of the new partition of Poland "and was given over to the Soviet protectorate"⁴⁰.

General Anders also took a stand on the findings of the Crimean conference, issuing an order to the army on February 14th, 1945, in which he described the decisions of the "Big Three" as "tragic moments for Poland and for the nation"⁴¹.

On March 12th, 1945, the Polish Government in exile made another statement, this time concerning the conference in San Francisco. The most meaningful paragraph of the document read as follows: 'The Polish Government declares that the fact that

³⁷ *Teheran-Jalta-Poczdam*, op. cit., p 160, 161.

³⁸ *Ibidem*, p. 155

³⁹ IJPUSA, *Rząd Polski na emigracji*, sign. 701/9/15, k. 269

⁴⁰ *Ibidem*, k. 256. The quotation comes from a telegram by the Polish Ambassador to the USA Cichowski. Document number 100: Dated 19 February 1945.

⁴¹ *Ibidem*, 266.

Poland, whose constitutional President and Government are widely recognised by the United Nations and the neutral nations of the world, apart from being a single power, is not invited to the San Francisco Conference, is the first worrying example of the application of the veto law of a great power, before the United Nations has adopted and implemented the proposals of the International Security Organisation⁴².

From a political point of view, these positions were of little importance. Decisions on the establishment of a government in the country were made much earlier in Moscow and, from July 1944, first in Chełm, then in Lublin and Warsaw there was a cabinet operating under the patronage of the USSR. To picture the dependence from Moscow a less important fact can be brought up. On July 22nd, 1944, Edward Osóbka-Morawski, a Foreign Affairs minister and General Michał Rola-Żymierski, a leader the Ministry of National Defence asked the Soviet Government for allowing 186 members of Polish Guerilla families to cross still unclear borders in order to relocate them from lands where the risk of Ukrainian fascists terrorising them was very high⁴³.

The final part of the article should mention the Potsdam Conference (July 17th – August 2nd, 1945), during which decisions on the borders of Poland, except for the eastern border, were made. The Republic of Poland was also recognised as a country not being an occupation zone of the USSR.

At the same time, the governments of Great Britain and the United States, in connection with the establishment of the Provisional Government of Polish National Unity in Poland on the basis of Yalta decisions and the establishment of diplomatic relations with it, decided to break all relations with the Archiszewski's Government in London⁴⁴.

The coming years have shown that the world at that time, including Europe, was divided into two opposing camps that fought against each other, a clear example of which can be found in the terms such as "The Cold War" or "The Iron Curtain".

Conclusions and perspectives of the next research

The problematic relations of Poland and USSR during and after the Second World War, has not been worked through. It can be explained with difficulties in access to archival files or unwillingness of some researchers to take up politically risky subjects. It grants perfect opportunity to, by using access to the files, create new texts, revealing the truth of the aforementioned times. To conclude, it seems necessary to, basing on unknown to this time sources, create new scientific works describing the relations of Poland and the USSR, putting emphasis on Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic. It is incredibly important to finally show the world the historical truth regarding, among other things, the attitude of The Big Three towards Poland and the aspirations directed towards the post-war borders. Equally important is the fact that nationalist groups of our Eastern neighbours are questioning the political division setting the Eastern borders of our country, despite such setting existing since the ending of Second World War.

⁴² Ibidem, s. 220. The following text was set up at the bottom of the document: "Ambassador Raczyński filed his application with the Foreign Office on 12 March 1945".

⁴³ New Files Archive (AAN), Polish Committee of National Freedom, microfilm 24060, sign. 1/12, k. 14.

⁴⁴ *Teheran-Jalta-Poczdam*, op. cit. s. 244.

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