
WSCHODNI ROCZNIK HUMANISTYCZNY
TOM XX (2023), Ng3
s. 81-103
doi: 10.36121/ozhurbatlitvinova.20.2023.3.081

Oleh Zhurba, ORCID 0000-0002-7800-0743
Tetiana Lytvynova, ORCID 0000-0002-8682-2819
(Oles Honchar Dnipro National University)

The Elite of Left-Bank Ukraine in the Second Half of the 18th to Mid-19th Centuries: Between Imperial and National Identities

Annotation: The article considers the Left-Bank elite's search for a national identity of its own and the complexities of the development of several competing 'Ukrainian' national projects. The authors attempt to do away with the historiographical stereotypes of the dual loyalty of the Little Russian *starshyna-szlachta/shliakhta-dvorianstvo*-nobility, its social egoism, and 'betrayal' of national interests and stress that the conception of the pre-modern nation developed by the nobility of Left-Bank Ukraine became the ideological ground for rethinking regional territorial patriotism in the categories of modern ethno-national identity. It is shown that the key problem in the formation of the modern Ukrainian intellectual project was less the conflict between the imperial and local identities than competition, and later confrontation, between different 'Ukrainian' national projects.

Keywords: Left-Bank Ukraine, Hetmanate, Russian Empire, Ukrainian gentry, national identity, 'long' 19th century, 'Ukrainian national revival', intellectual history.

Elita lewobrzeżnej Ukrainy w drugiej połowie XVIII i pierwszej XIX w.: między tożsamością imperialną a narodową

Streszczenie: Artykuł dotyczy poszukiwania przez elity lewobrzeżnej Ukrainy własnej tożsamości narodowej oraz złożoności rozwoju kilku konkurencyjnych „ukraińskich” projektów narodowych. Autorzy starają się przełamać historiograficzne stereotypy o podwójnej lojalności małorosyjskiej szlachty-szlachty (*szlachty - dvorianstwa*), jej egoizmie społecznym i „zdradzie” interesów narodowych oraz podkreślają, że koncepcja narodu przednowoczesnego rozwijana przez szlachtę lewobrzeżnej Ukrainy stała się ideologiczną podstawą do przemyślenia regionalnego patriotyzmu terytorialnego w kategoriach współczesnej tożsamości etniczno-narodowej. Autorzy wskazują, że kluczowym problemem w kształtowaniu się współczesnego ukraińskiego projektu intelektualnego był nie tyle konflikt tożsamości imperialnej i lokalnej, co rywalizacja, a później konfrontacja, pomiędzy różnymi „ukraińskimi” projektami narodowymi.

Słowa kluczowe: Ukraina lewobrzeżna, Hetmanat, Imperium Rosyjskie, szlachta ukraińska, tożsamość narodowa, „długi” wiek XIX, „odrodzenie narodowe Ukrainy”, historia intelektualna.

The search for productive ways to represent the history of Ukraine in the ‘long’ 19th century and sound approaches to the study of its problematic and thematic nodes remains to this day an essential and socially pressing task, as evidenced by the numerous works in this field that have appeared in recent years¹. There are still a number of methodological and ideological obstacles on this path, overcoming which can open up new cognitive horizons and help us conceptualize this period of our history and understand its people and society in more sophisticated and productive ways.

Declarations of loyalty to the principles of historicism notwithstanding, Ukrainian historiography is dominated by a teleological view of the ‘long’ 19th century, where historians seek and, of course, find the origins of today’s developments and phenomena. It is studied and represented mostly as a period of the formation and evolution of the Ukrainian national movement, with the result that, as Oleksandr Ohloblin wrote back in the 1970s, “...the wide and full-flowing river of Ukraine’s historical process turned into a narrow, albeit strong and fast, stream, with almost the entire social life of that era’s Ukraine remaining beyond and outside of it”².

Ukrainian history is imagined as the past of a single homogeneous territory and always-one Ukrainian people. In both didactic and research parlance, the concept of ‘the Ukrainian lands’, referring to the entire expanse occupied by the modern Ukrainian state, is widely used in the ethnic and/or territorial sense when talking about periods from Ancient Rus’ to the beginning of the 20th century. Meanwhile, the defining feature of national history – its heavy regionalization – remains overlooked.

Another methodological barrier complicating the representation of the Ukrainian 19th century is the tragic image of an oppressed, demeaned, and robbed nation, with all the blame for its wretched fate being borne by forces external to the ‘true’ Ukrainians (insidious neighbors and their state institutions, or traitors to the national idea). This was an image painstakingly cultivated by leaders of the Ukrainian movement in the second half of the 19th century. Such victimization of national history, which at one time, without a doubt, legitimized the struggle for liberation, can hardly contribute to the normalization of modern research strategies. Another

¹ S. Bilenky, *Laboratory of Modernity: Ukraine between Empire and Nation, 1772–1914*. Montreal: Published by McGill-Queen’s University Press. 2023; *Eighteenth-Century Ukraine: New Perspectives on Social, Cultural, and Intellectual History*, eds. Z. Kohut, V. Sklokin, F. Sysyn, Montreal 2023; Я. Грицак, *Нарис історії України: Формування модерної української нації XIX – XX ст.* Київ 2019; С. Єкельчик, *Історія України. Становлення модерної нації*, Київ 2011, 376 с.; О. Аркуша, К. Кондратюк, М. Мудрий, О. Сухий, *Час народів. Історія України XIX століття*, Львів 2016; О. Рєснт *Україна в імперську добу (XIX – початок XX століття)*, Київ 2016; С. Світленко, *Українське XIX століття: етнонаціональні, інтелектуальні та історіософські контексти*, Дніпро 2018; Ю. Терещенко, *Довге XIX століття: спротив асиміляції*, Київ 2022, 840 с.; В. Шандра, О. Аркуша, *Україна в XIX ст.: людиність та імперії*, Київ 2022.

² О. Оглоблин, *Проблема схеми історії України 19–20 століття (до 1917 року)*, «Український історик», 1971, № 1/2, с. 5–6.

expressive anchor of the narrativization of national history is the idea of Ukraine's global messianism, explained in the categories of miracle³.

The causes of this state of historiographical affairs deserve a special consideration, but among them one cannot fail to note the absence of internal academic demand, which is compensated by a sincere impulse to satisfy a social and political appetite. The Russian aggression has further exacerbated the situation, stimulating one-dimensional narratives (especially with regard to the imperial period of Ukrainian history), accusatory pathos, and anachronistic conceptions and approaches.

All this fully applies to the intellectual history of Ukraine. The stormy events of the 20th and 21st centuries have cemented a close alliance between national historical scholarship on the one hand and power structures and political actors on the other, which is not conducive to viewing the history of social movements and their ideological accompaniment as a complex, multidimensional, and dynamic phenomenon. Thus, the lively flow of social thought in its interaction with the state and the public, rife with vigorous debate, internal disputes, and conflicts, and competing with intellectual constructs of the neighbors, primarily Poles and Russians, is reduced to scholastic schemes of the orderly succession of ideas and periods. In addition, the intellectual history of Ukraine in the 19th century is still mostly portrayed as a history of struggle for the formation, development, and triumph of the Ukrainian ethno-national project. At the basis of such constructions lies the uncritically received scheme of Miroslav Hroch⁴, which inspires attempts to modernize the century-old dictums of Mykhailo Hrushevsky.

Accordingly, the activities of the Ukrainian intellectuals of the second half of the 18th and 19th centuries are also customarily considered through the prism of the theory of 'national revival'. This theory fulfills a two-fold historiographical task, writing the Ukrainian space into the context of socio-cultural developments shared with Europe (while simultaneously writing it out of imperial ones⁵) and counteracting modern 'Little Russianism', which became, starting with the revolution of 1917, one of the main enemies and competitors of the modern Ukrainian project. To put it briefly, the Ukrainians of the second half of the 18th and first half of the 19th centuries, so to speak, passed the baton of ethnic identity to the figures of the Ukrainian movement of the second half of the 19th century, and these, in their turn, handed it to the generation of Hrushevsky in order that this heritage become the property of the Ukrainians of the 21st century. This linear, anachronistic scheme, so popular in both analytical and didactic historical writing, does not withstand criticism, as it denies the intellectuals of the 'Ukrainian' regions of the two empires their proper self-identification, imposing on them forms of self-representation in the categories of another time and another style of thinking.

³ Я. Грищак, *Спаси себе і спаси ціле людство*: <https://zbruc.eu/node/115430?fbclid=IwAR104s-anWGodDLq3INyU0fngzppxf9gdIlg56kZyhsXH9nUnpUOZJTHCebw> [accessed 19.09.2023].

⁴ The uncritical reception of this scheme is evident first and foremost in dating the beginnings of the 'national revival' to the second half of the 18th and first half of the 19th centuries, when there was still no modern Ukrainian identity to speak of. Thus, for instance, had Mykhailo Maksymovych learned that he was classified as a prominent figure of the first stage of the Ukrainian national revival, he would have not only been surprised, but also adamantly distanced himself from such a label.

⁵ *Схід-Захід: історико-культурологічний збірник*, Харків 2001, вип.4: *Rossia et Britannia: імперії та нації на окраїнах Європи; Ireland and Ukraine. Studies in Comparative Imperial and National History*, eds: S. Velychenko, J. Ruane, L. Hrynevych, Stuttgart 2022.

For example, Serhii Plokhyy has stated that the *History of the Rus'* fits perfectly into the first stage of the Ukrainian national revival, and the year of its first dated manuscript (1818) strangely coincides with the publication of the first grammar of the modern Ukrainian language, first collection of Ukrainian folk songs, and first Ukrainian plays⁶. It is as if the authors of these latter texts, Oleksiy Pavlovsky, Mykola Tsertelev, and Ivan Kotliarevsky, were mistaken in their belief that they were putting out a *Grammar of the Little Russian Tongue*, publishing 'Little Russian songs', or paraphrasing *The Aeneid* and writing texts for the theater in the 'Little Russian language' (italics ours)⁷.

It is obvious that this already complicated terminological situation also suffers from the weak elaboration of the social, economic, and intellectual history of Ukraine in the 18th and 19th centuries, which facilitates its semi-academic instrumentalization and turns "the generally necessary terminological studies into nothing but concept juggling that does not clarify anything"⁸. We should keep in mind that intense search for a name for the newly invented ethnic community was still going on among the intellectuals as late as the mid-19th century. In their turn, the Ukrainian identity and the name 'Ukraine', together with the diverse self-identifications of the regional elites ('Little Russians', 'Slobozhans', 'Kyivans', 'Volhynians', 'Rusyns', and others), displayed elements of pre-modern administrative-territorial or religious self-awareness. This is prominently confirmed by the fact that professional histories of almost all Ukrainian regions were completed in the second half of the 19th century, while formulating a shared collective biography of the Ukrainian ethnos had to wait until the turn of the 20th century⁹.

The representation of the mechanisms and forms of self-identification of regional elites is also an important problem. Its solution cannot be reduced to a simplified and scholastic statement of dual loyalty. This problem is directly related to the issue of historical and historiographical regionalization¹⁰, which shaped the patterns of self-perception. Its difficulty stems from the traditionally high degree of instability of the administrative-political, demographic, cultural-religious, geopolitical, socio-economic, and, finally, linguistic situation. Only the climate and ecoregions remained relatively fixed. During the period we are considering, colossal migration flows displaced hundreds of thousands of people who transferred to new territories, in addition to movable property and productive skills, their historical ideas and ways of self-identification.

All this could not but stimulate the formation of a very elastic and changeable conceptual apparatus, when, for example, the terms 'Little Russian' and 'Little Russia', or 'Ukrainian' and 'Ukraine', could be situationally loaded with different meanings even in texts by the same author. In addition, the dominance of a certain identification

⁶ С. Плохий, *Козацький міф. Історія та націотворення в епоху імперії*, Київ 2013, с. 387.

⁷ This 'creative' approach to the sources in the study of the identities of the Left-Bank elite is the subject of an excellent article by Vadym Adadurov (*Народження одного історичного міфу: проблема «Наполеон і Україна» у висвітленні Льва Борщака*, «Україна модерна», 2005, вип. 9, с. 212–236.

⁸ Т. Литвинова, «Поміщицька правда». *Дворянство Лівобережної України та селянське питання наприкінці XVIII – в першій половині XIX ст. (ідеологічний аспект)*, Дніпропетровськ 2011, с. 32.

⁹ О. Журба, Т. Литвинова, *Нарративізація українського минулого в кінці XIX – на початку XXI століття: можливо ли це?*, [w:] *Вестник Пермского университета. История*, 2020, №. 3, с. 27–41.

¹⁰ О. Журба, *Проблеми історіографічного районування та пошуки регіональних ідентичностей*, [w:] *Регіональна історія України*, Київ 2008, вип. 2, с. 47–58; Журба О.І. «Національне» та «регіональне» у модерних репрезентаціях історії українського історіописання, [w:] *Український гуманітарний огляд*, 2013, вип. 18, с. 9–50.

marker (for example, 'Ukraine' as the space of a undivided ethno-national community, which took root in the writings of the Cyril-Methodians in the mid-19th century) did not mean the complete displacement of another ('Ukraine' as the Cossack domain, or as the southern, steppe portion of the Hetmanate in the second half of the 18th century, or as the area of the Sloboda regiments in the late 17th and 18th centuries, or as the Sloboda Ukraine Governorate at the end of the 18th – beginning of the 19th century). The perception of 'Little Russia', from the mid-17th to early 20th century, underwent a profound, complex, and non-linear evolution¹¹, competing not only with other concepts, but also with itself. This is well understood by some modern historians, who note that

...formulating a universal assessment of this concept that would measure up to its almost three-hundred-year history is a matter of extreme difficulty. After all, this phenomenon was different in different times and eras, and therefore it needs to be considered in specific historical contexts¹².

Such defining factors of national history as regionalism, the fact that various parts of Ukraine's present-day territory belonged for centuries to other states, and the resulting varicolored and complicated self-identification of local elites began to be actively instrumentalized in the ideological and political struggle of the post-Soviet era, both in dealing with internal problems and in international relations. This, along with yet another historiographical turn towards the study of intellectual history, stimulated great interest in such issues, not limited to the academic milieu.

Historians of the early modern era that connect their research genealogy with the 'school' of Natalia Yakovenko have made notable advances in this thematic field. Particularly important has been the rejection of colonial discourse in the representation of the history of Ukraine as part of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; this period has begun to be treated as 'normal past', a time when cultures, elites, and experiences interacted with each other and complex, changing, elastic identities were formed. A characteristic case in point is the title of Vitaly Mykhailovsky's recent book *Our Kings*, portraying Polish monarchs as important actors of Ukrainian history¹³.

The problem of identities is very closely connected with the study of Ukraine's elite groups (the *szlachta/shliakhta/shliakhetstvo*, Cossack *starshyna*, *dvorianstvo*). Focusing on the nobility enables historians to raise the question of its participation in the development of modern national culture and dismantle the stereotype that Ukrainian society in the 19th century lacked a national elite of its own. The opinion of Natalia Starchenko, expressed in the context of the study of early modernity, seems to us perfectly applicable to the period with which we are concerned: "We need to change our approaches to the concept of the 'Ukrainian *shliakhta*', rejecting the clichés about

¹¹ А. Миллер, *Малоросс*, [w:] «Понятия о России»: К семантике имперского периода, Москва 2012, с. 392–443; Н. Яковенко, *Вибір імені versus вибір шляху: назви української території між кінцем XVI – кінцем XVII ст.*, [w:] Яковенко Н.М. *Дзеркала ідентичностей. Дослідження з історії уявлень та ідей в Україні XVI – початку XVIII ст.*, Київ 2012, с. 9–43; О. Журба, *Понятие «Малороссия» и национальные прецеденты XVIII – XIX века*, [w:] *Българска украинистика: алманах*, 2020, № 9, с. 199–209.

¹² Р. Пиріг, *Гетьманат Павла Скоропадського: комплекс малоросійства правлячої еліти*, «Український історичний журнал» (hereafter *УІЖ*), 2023, № 4, с. 62.

¹³ В. Михайловський, *Наші королі. Володарі та династії в історії України (1340–1795)*, Київ 2023.

its 'Polonization' and 'Catholicization'""¹⁴. In the same way, we should rethink our approaches to the concept of the 'Ukrainian *dvorianstvo*' and the concomitant clichés about its 'Russification', 'Polonization', and 'betrayal' of national interests. This requires playing attention to contexts, meanings, and situations. However, we have to agree with Volodymyr Sklokin's statement that intellectual history remains one of the most neglected areas in Ukrainian historiography:

The reason for this... is not only that the time for synthesis has not yet come and we need to work with sources on a concrete-historical level. More often, the problem turns out to be the inability to properly read the artifacts, to put them in the pertinent context of the Eastern and Western European intellectual tradition¹⁵.

Still, some successes in the normalization of the intellectual history of Ukrainian Modernity are worth noting¹⁶. Among them, the collective monograph *Imperial Identities in Ukrainian History, 18th to First Half of the 19th Centuries* stands out for its cumulative academic punch¹⁷. This text conceptually completed the process of Ukrainian historians' mastering the approaches of the 'new imperial history', in which the empire is considered not from the standpoint of its destructive influence on regions, but as a space of equal interaction between numerous actors, among which regional elites and the imperial authorities play the leading roles.

As the preface to the *Imperial Identities* rightly observes, the outcome of taking this research angle was the rethinking of several important theses that had previously dominated national historical scholarship. In the current historiographical situation, it is worth recalling them. Thus,

...statements were refuted regarding: a) the continuity of the struggle for autonomy...; b) the mutual exclusivity of the empire and nation in the period under consideration, which, in turn, explains the almost complete absence of examples of separatist sentiment among the Ukrainian elites of that time; c) the isolation of the ethnos from the changes and processes that had a general impact across the entire supranational imperial space; d) the downtrodden condition of the Ukrainian language, even though in fact it functioned and even gained a certain popularity in the imperial literary context"¹⁸.

¹⁴ Н. Старченко, *Мусимо говорити про українську Річ Посполиту*, «Локальна історія», 2021, № 9, с. 79.

¹⁵ В. Склокін, *Чи існувало українське Просвітництво? Кілька міркувань щодо незавершеної історіографічної дискусії*, «Київська Академія», 2015, № 12, с. 146

¹⁶ А. Толочко, *Киевская Русь и Малороссия в XIX веке*, Киев 2012; Т. Литвинова, «Поміщицька правда». *Дворянство Лівобережної України та селянське питання наприкінці XVIII – у першій половині XIX століття*, Дніпропетровськ 2011; О. Журба, «Українські» національні проекти довгого XIX ст. в імперському просторі, [w:] *Історія та історіографія в Європі*, Київ 2019. вип. 6, с. 62–69; Б. Галь, *Геоконцепт «Малороссія» на ментальних картах XVIII – першої половини XIX в.*, [w:] *Имя народа. Украина и ее население в официальных и научных терминах, публицистике и литературе. Сб. Статей*, Москва 2016, с. 8–28.

¹⁷ *Імперські ідентичності в українській історії XVIII – першої половини XIX ст.* ред. В. Ададуров и В. Склокін, Лівів 2020.

¹⁸ В. Ададуров, В. Склокін, *Вступ*, [w:] *Імперські ідентичності в українській історії XVIII – першої*

The authors of the monograph focused their attention on the mechanisms of construction and development by the elites of complex hierarchies of imperial-regional-national-religious-estate identities, the knotty interweaving of which gave rise to not just double, but multi-level loyalties and various perspectives, including the program of the formation of a Ukrainian ethno-national project, realized during the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries.

However, the book unfortunately does not cover the region most important for the emergence of the modern Ukrainian project – Left-Bank Ukraine/Hetmanate/Little Russia and its elite groups. It is all the more surprising because the special responsibility of this region and the Little Russian nobility (*shliakhetstvo-dvorianstvo*) for the cause of the consolidation of the national elite and modernization of the Ukrainian intellectual space is generally recognized¹⁹. This recognition has even produced the concept of ‘Littlerussification’, explained by Oleksiy Tolochko as the spread of the image of Little Russia over territories formerly belonging to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Ottoman Porte²⁰. That is why in this essay we will focus particularly on how the intellectuals of Left-Bank Ukraine/Little Russia engaged with the images of their Fatherland during the transitional period of the second half of the 18th to mid-19th centuries – the time when the political Hetmanate was fading from view and the Little Russian elite was busy mastering new social roles and searching for new identities²¹.

In defining the chronological limits of the analysis, we proceeded from the understanding that this was a period of the transformation of the local elites’ regional administrative-territorial patriotism (legitimized in the case of the former Hetmanate by treaties of submission to Russian monarchs) towards ethno-national self-awareness, which significantly expanded the perception of the borders of Old Little Russia and of the mechanisms of its relationship with the empire. It was a time not only of the incorporation of the Ukrainian regions into the system of the empire, but also of internal Ukrainian integration, the development of ideology, strategy, and tactics for defining the place of the region and its elite in the imperial space. The image of one’s Fatherland, the idea of its status and boundaries and of the role of various social groups in its past, present, and future was changing accordingly.

In Ukraine’s intellectual history, a special place is occupied by Hryhoriy Andriyovych Poletyka (1725-1784). He, in our view, deserves the credit for substantiating and conceptualizing the project of the pre-modern Little Russian nation, which was the starting point for the search for new models of national identities throughout the 19th century. Considerable interest in this figure has been shown not only by Ukrainian,

половини XIX ст., с. 13.

¹⁹ З. Когут, *Розвиток малоросійської самосвідомості і українське національне будівництво*, [w:] З. Когут, *Коріння ідентичності. Студії з ранньомодерної та модерної історії України*, Київ 2004, с. 80-101.

²⁰ А. Толочко, *Киевская Русь и Малороссия в XIX веке*, с. 65-66.

²¹ We have touched on this subject before: О. Журба, Т. Литвинова, *Гетманщина в представленнях української інтелектуальної еліти другої половини XVIII – середини XIX в. Часть 1, «Диалог со временем»*, 2020, вип. 73, с. 112-126; О. Журба, Т. Литвинова, *Гетманщина в представленнях української інтелектуальної еліти другої половини XVIII – середини XIX в. Часть 2. Новые образы Отчизны, «Диалог со временем»*, 2021, вип. 75, с. 335-345.

but also by foreign authors²², which makes it superfluous to delve into the details of his biography. We will not enter into discussion about the labeling of his views (traditionalist, conservative, *shliakhta* commentator, progressive conservative, or other) – this question merits a special, more nuanced analysis. For now, it is important to state that it was this European, educated, wealthy Little Russian landowner, well integrated into the capital's intellectual, academic, and educational milieu since as early as the 1740s, who in the 1760s formulated and presented to the government in St. Petersburg the collective view of the elite of the Hetmanate regarding the status of their region and its place in the 'imperial project', laying the foundation for the formation of the image of the Fatherland received by the subsequent generations. He is a good case study for tackling once again the problem of interaction between the 'imperial' and the 'national/regional' and reconsidering the gaps in 'nation-building' and 'integration/incorporation' of the Ukrainian elite into the system of the empire – issues that are viewed rather simplistically in present-day historiography.

Poletyka had to assume the role of a public leader for the first time in 1763 at the so-called Hlukhiv Congress (Council) of the *starshyna* and *shliakhta*. According to the first and one of the best historians of this event Dmytro Miller, his address *On Improving the State of Little Russia* (hereafter 'the address') "served... as a program for the subsequent work" of the congress²³, whose outcome was the *Petition of the Little Russian Shliakhetstvo and Starshyna, Along with the Hetman, Concerning the Restoration of Diverse Ancient Rights of Little Russia, Submitted to Catherine II in 1764*²⁴ and a radical reform of the judicial practices in the region.

The significance of the Hlukhiv Congress for the public life of Little Russia and the unanimity that prevailed at this fairly representative gathering have been repeatedly stressed in the literature. The congress clearly demonstrated that by the 1760s the Left-Bank Hetmanate had its own elite, which understood the need to reform all aspects of the region's life. Miller's analysis of the lists of representatives from the regiments and hundreds attending the congress led him to assert that

²² З. Когут, *Російський централізм і українська автономія. Ліквідація Гетьманщини 1760–1830*, Київ 1996. 317; Т. Литвинова, *Малоросс в российском культурно-историкогеографическом пространстве второй половины XVIII в.*, [w:] *Дніпропетровський історико-археологічний збірник (далі: ДІАЗ)*, 2001, с. 28–64; Т. Литвинова, Г.А. Полетика: «публичный интеллектual» второй половины XVIII в., [w:] *Вестник Омского университета. Исторические науки*, 2015, № 2(6), с. 79–86; Д. Руднев, Г.А. Полетика и издательская деятельность Морского кадетского корпуса в 1760–1770-е гг., [w:] *Вторые Луптовские чтения*, Москва 2006, с. 42–72; Д. Руднев, Григорий Андреевич Полетика и книжная культура XVIII века [w:] *Литературная культура России XVIII века*, Санкт-Петербург 2008, вып. 2, с. 53–64; Я. Лазарев, *Идейное поле «национального» интеллектuala имперского периода: взгляды Г.А. Полетики (1725–1784) на «украинскую государственность»*, [w:] *Slověne=Словъне*, 2016, № 1, с. 184–202; А. Melnik, T. Tairova-Yakovleva, *Hryhorii Poletyka's Introduction of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy Educational Methods in the Russian Empire*, «Kyiv-Mohyla Humanities Journal», 2019, № 6, p. 115–126.

²³ Д. Миллер, *Очерки из истории и юридического быта старой Малороссии. Суды земские, городские и подкоморские в XVIII в.*, [w:] *Сборник Харьковского Историко-филологического общества*, 1896, т. 8, с. 109.

²⁴ *Прошение малороссийского шляхетства и старшины, вместе с гетманом, о возстановлении разных старинных прав Малороссии, поданное Екaтерина II в 1764 году*, «Киевская старина» (hereafter КС), 1883, июнь, с. 317–345.

the participants,... – if not all, then at least the majority – were men of culture. At that time, colonels and the regimental *starshyna* were almost exclusively made up of learned persons; the same certainly goes for *bunchuk* comrades – this, in a sense, ‘noble’ Little Russian gentry; even *sotnyks* were chosen from among ‘the most sound’, that is, those who had a sufficient understanding of the strength and importance of Little Russian rights. ...Many of them, moreover, knew the history of their homeland very well²⁵.

Consequently, Poletyka’s thoughts in his address on the subject of the causes of his fatherland’s decline, as well as his call to put away “all prejudices and particular benefits” and think “about the restoration of the former ways and prosperity”, fell on favorable soil and, according to Miller, expressed the general unanimous view of the congress²⁶.

Comparing the address and the petition to the empress gives grounds to assert that Poletyka was directly involved in the drafting of the latter, and perhaps was one of its authors. The petition’s preamble lays out his conception of the history of Ukraine and its relations with Poland and Russia, based on his characteristic selection of official documents. The main part of the petition represents, in fact, only a more detailed and elaborate version of the plan of transformations formulated in the address.

The speaker’s proposals for the reform of the law and the Cossack army, advancement of trade, and restoration of the *sejms*, tribunal, general council, and land and town courts, demands for the return of the lands assigned for the settlements of foreigners, and propositions regarding the schismatics, Sloboda regiments, the fortified line, and other matters were reproduced in the petition in almost the same form as in the address. Poletyka’s idea that a violation of the rights and privileges of any estate leads to violation of the rights of all the other estates and Fatherland as a whole is reflected in the Hlukhiv Congress’s request to confirm “the rights of... the Little Russian hetman, the *shliakhetstvo*, the clerical estate, the army, the townfolk, and the entire people”²⁷. Defending thus the interests of not only the elite, but also society as a whole, the petition, in a way, reaffirmed the view that Little Russia was a distinct social, economic, and political entity, connected to Russia only through the person of the monarch. In the view of Zenon Kohut, this document contained the kind of autonomist views that had not been expressed so openly since the time of Mazepa²⁸. Even if Kohut’s assessment is correct, however, the comparison is hardly appropriate. Neither Mazepa nor his entourage tried to formulate ‘autonomist’ demands within the framework of Russian legitimacy.

So, during the 1760s the elite of Left-Bank Ukraine not only matured enough to understand the need for restructuring all aspects of the region’s life, but also was able to formulate a social and political program of its own, as if in contrast to the one presented to Catherine II by Grigory Teplov in the fall of 1763, informed by the same motif of reform but from an imperial, centralizing standpoint²⁹.

²⁵ Д. Миллер, *Очерки...*, с. 103.

²⁶ *Ibidem*, с. 106.

²⁷ *Прошение малороссийского шляхетства...*, с. 321.

²⁸ З. Когут, *Коріння ідентичності...*, с. 103.

²⁹ М. Василенко, Г.Н. Теплов і його «Записка о неприядах в Малороссии», [w:] *Записки Українського*

Without repeating existing interpretations, we will note that this blueprint of transformations can be understood in a variety of ways. From the point of view of socio-economic determinism, it can be regarded as an attempt by the Little Russian nobility to defend its interests; from a cultural point of view, it expressed a specific mentality that included elements of various cultural influences – the Ruthenian-Polish noble ethos, ideas of the Western European Enlightenment, and traditions of Russian-Orthodox pietism towards the tsar's authority; from the point of view of the development of the Ukrainian national idea, this was a notable attempt (one of several) to shore up local statehood by legitimate methods; from the point of view of political science, this was an imperial program reflecting a struggle between the two tendencies inherent in any state entity (particularly imperial) – centripetal and centrifugal; from the point of view of general legal history, it represented an attempt to realize the ideas of natural law within a framework of legal voluntarism³⁰. In our view, a student of intellectual history needs to take into account the entire range of possible approaches, thereby creating conditions for inscribing this phenomenon into the historical context in all its diversity.

While fashioning a program of regional reconstruction depended on the local society's internal capabilities, its implementation ran into the opposite view held by the central government, which in the end led to results that Poletyka probably had not foreseen. But his energetic participation in the work of the congress, attitude towards public affairs, ideological stance, and quality of argumentation earned him fairly wide popularity and, without a doubt, contributed to the election of this St. Petersburg resident as a deputy from the nobility of the Lubny Regiment to the Commission for the Drafting of the New Code of Laws.

In the person of Poletyka, the nobility found a tenacious fighter for autonomous rights, who proved himself one of the most active deputies of the Grand Assembly of the Commission. As early as May 1768, he was elected member of the commission "for consideration of the method of revenue collection and method of expenditures". And already on May 20 of the same year, he presented a huge tome entitled *The Rights, Privileges, Benefits, Liberties, and Freedoms of the Little Russian Nobility*³¹ – the fruit of many years of collecting acts and charters, with the earliest going back to 1433 (privileges and oaths of Polish kings, articles of constitutions, treaty articles between hetmans and Russian monarchs, universals, chapters of the Lithuanian Statute, decrees and charters of tsars, emperors, and empresses, and more). Most importantly, however, Poletyka subjected to critical analysis the instruction given by the Collegium of Little Russia to its deputy Dmytro Natalin, which had a significant impact on the entire Hetmanate delegation.

Arguing against the collegium's provisions as unnecessary, superfluous, and consistent with neither the traditions nor character of the people, Poletyka, in fact, took a stance in opposition to the imperial government. Addressing Catherine II at the end of his *Objection*, he stressed that, in representing "our needs and wants... the first and dearer than life itself we consider the preservation of our rights, privileges, benefits, freedoms, and customs and the actual use of them", while the measures proposed by

наукового Товариства в Києві, 1911, кн. 2, с. 17–41.

³⁰ Т. Литвинова, «Прогресивний консерватизм» – випадкове словосполучення, чи факт української суспільної думки другої половини XVIII ст., [w:] ДІАЗ, 1997, вип. 1, с. 376. (С. 372–385).

³¹ ІР НБУВ. Ф. VIII. № 173. 310 л.

the Collegium of Little Russia “are all coerced, all forced, all onerous, all agreeing with neither the condition of our people, nor upbringing, nor habits thereof. Our laws are deemed as dispensable”, he wrote,

which, however, are more in accord with philanthropy than many others; our service, which was always pleasing to the ancestors of Your Imperial Majesty and repeatedly commended by them, is destroyed; our people, which cannot be said to be worse than others in their rights and behavior, are described in poor aspect and unpleasant colors; means are presented towards our burdening and, it could be said, inevitable ruin³².

Poletyka was a supporter of only such changes as were in keeping with the preservation of the national traditions. He consistently upheld this position, obviously attractive to the majority of the Little Russian deputies, in his speeches and notes to the Grand Assembly.

At a meeting on 21 August 1768, Poletyka made strong objections to almost all points of the discussed *Project of the Right of the Nobles*³³. Demanding jurisprudential accuracy, he critiqued every article, but his opinion on article 43 is especially interesting. Disagreeing with the wording “no one except the Russian nobles in Russia can enjoy these rights”, Poletyka insisted on preserving all the rights and privileges of the Little Russian nobility, clergy, burghers, and Cossacks. Twenty-six Little Russian deputies agreed with this stance: eight from the nobility, ten from the towns, and eight from the Cossacks³⁴. Such support shows how much Poletyka’s attitude reflected the inclinations of all the deputies and their ideas about the future of their homeland, and belies the argument that 18th-century Little Russian society lacked patriotism or aspiration not only to national, but “even to provincial distinctiveness”³⁵.

Thus, the region’s deputies warmly backed Poletyka regardless of which social group they represented in the Commission. It is interesting that Cossack deputies, along with those from the *shliakhetstvo*, also took part in the discussion of article 43. Thus, M. Tymofeyev, sent to St. Petersburg by the Cossacks of the Lubny Regiment, heartily supported the nobility’s desire to have the wording of the article changed, primarily on the grounds “that all... treaties and agreements during the happy accession of L. Russia to the Russian Empire were made by consensus of all the estates...” and that “L. Russia has until now stood on and been governed by this felicitous unity”³⁶.

Turning to such representative, from the standpoint of the study of social consciousness, sources as ‘instructions’ to, and ‘addresses’ made by, Little Russian deputies in the Legislative Commission convinces us that, along with the advocacy of narrow

³² *Возражение депутата Григория Полетики, [w:] Чтения в Обществе истории и древностей российских, 1858, кн. 3, смесь, с. 53.*

³³ Г.А. Полетика, *Мнение о начитанном проекте правам благородных, [w:] Сборник Русского исторического общества (далее: Сборник РИО), Санкт-Петербург 1882, т. 36, с. 346-356.*

³⁴ Т. Литвинова, «Прогрессивный консерватизм»..., с. 378.

³⁵ В. Авсеенко, *Малороссия в 1767 г. Эпизод из истории XVIII ст. По неизданным источникам, Киев 1864, с. 55; В. Латкин, Законодательные комиссии в России, Санкт-Петербург 1887, т. 1, с. 266.*

³⁶ *Обзор занятий Большого Собрания с 7 апреля по 9 сентября 1768 года, [w:] Сборник РИО, 1881, т. 32, с. 316-318.*

estate, regional, and 'particular' interests, these documents clearly reveal a consolidating view regarding the need to restore the entire complex of socio-political institutions established by the 'treaty articles' of 1654. Accordingly, we should seek the foundation of the self-identity of the Little Russians during this period in the socio-political sphere, through which ethnic distinctiveness was realized. Even the path towards resolving socio-economic problems was seen in the solution of socio-political ones – confirmation of the "rights, privileges, and customs" and preservation of the traditional judicial, administrative, and military organization. These demands run through all of the 'instructions', 'petitions', and 'addresses.' And since the main guardians and translators of the historical tradition (at least in its socio-political aspect) were people of the Cossack background, this phenomenon is most clearly visible in the Cossack and *shliakhta* 'instructions' and speeches.

The deep socio-economic rifts between the Cossacks and the *shliakhetstvo* that did exist at that time call into question the possibility of a socio-political alliance. But at the level of consciousness and mentality, they were very close, connected by a community of fate, service, administration, court, and traditional forms of life. Furthermore, the new noble ethos was still just being formed. The active process of social stratification, while it complicated the framing of a shared socio-political program, did not prevent a consolidation of efforts in defense of the region's autonomy during this period. It is no accident that Poletyka helped in drafting Cossack and even burgher 'instructions'.

Despite the existing contradictions between estates and some ideological differences, the delegation of the Hetmanate did successfully develop a 'program' in the form of the *Petition of the Little Russian Deputies During the Drafting of the Code of Laws*, submitted to Catherine II on behalf of twenty "deputies of regiments and towns" by Poletyka, M. Motonis, V. Dunin-Borkivsky, V. Zolotnytsky, and P. Rymsha³⁷. Thus, Left-Bank Ukraine once again positioned itself not as a collection of disparate estates and groups, but as a distinct region, a special autonomous part of the Russian Empire. This influenced the government's subsequent policy concerning the incorporation of the region. The pan-imperial program, faced in the second half of the 18th and first half of the 19th centuries with a consolidated opposition of the local elite, was forced to look for compromise with regard to Little Russia.

Thus, during the 1760s the writings of Poletyka and collective programs of the local intellectuals were giving shape to the image of Little Russia as a nation in its own right. The project of the pre-modern Little Russian nation of the second half of the 18th and early 19th centuries, as the foundational intellectual product for the construction of the entire range of 'Ukrainian' national projects until the beginning of the 20th century, is significantly underappreciated in historiography. The question of its role in the formation of modern Ukrainianism has been raised by Kohut. However, despite the important conclusion that "the development of the Little Russian identity turned out to be the start of modern Ukrainian nation-building", the historian's other observations can be called into question – particularly the pessimistic statement that "the rise of historical self-awareness testified not to a further development of the Little Russian identity, but rather to confidence in its inevitable decline." He claimed that "instead of evolving into a modern Little Russian national consciousness, the Little Russian identity followed the

³⁷ ІР НБУВ. Ф. VIII., ф. VIII, № 1745–1746, арк. 1–1 зб.

path of a peculiar *Landespatriotismus*, which mourned the decline of the Little Russian nation". Kohut also recognized the ambivalence of its effects – on the one hand, the Little Russian identity played an important role in the process of modern Ukrainian nation-building, but on the other it "prepared supporters of the Great Russian idea, who considered the Little Russians to be a branch of one Russian nation"³⁸.

The idea that this form of self-identification, which constituted the intellectual foundation of the pre-modern nation, disappeared with the latter in the 1840s and led to the formation of only two competing national projects seems to us to be a grave simplification. Still, it should be recognized that Kohut's theses became an important step towards the legitimization of research on the Little Russian intellectual heritage of the second half of the 18th to early 20th centuries in modern Ukrainian historiography. It is clear that the undeservedly neglected 'project of the Little Russian nation', which matured during the 18th century and, in the view of historians, was 'buried' in the first half of the 19th, was a fully grown socio-political, mental, and intellectual product, in contrast to the amorphous, situational, exclusive, shimmery, and unfinished 'Little Russian' and 'Ukrainian' projects of the 19th century. It was formally complete, substantiated, clearly laid out, and publicly presented and discussed primarily in the texts of Poletyka. The ideas he developed, which were backed by legal and historical arguments, laid the foundation for the attitude towards the Hetmanate absorbed by the following generation of the 'children' in the literal and figurative sense of the word, by which time the military-administrative peculiarities of their homeland had been effaced.

The generation of the 'children' of the Little Russian social and intellectual elite, under different conditions, also demonstrated readiness for corporate solidarity and determination to protect national interests. At the turn of the 19th century, the elite were still aware of the need to defend the interests not only of their own estate, but also of the region as a whole, which interests, just like in the times of Poletyka, were seen to lie in the preservation of the rights of all social groups. The Left-Bank landowners demonstrated this when they prepared an appeal to Alexander I from the *dvorianstvo* of the Little Russia Governorate in 1801. Contrary to historians' persistent accusations that the nobility was always focused on their own narrow self-interest, a number of district 'statements', on the basis of which this appeal was drawn up, raised questions about the 'needs' and interests of not only the noble estate, but also the entire Little Russian nation. The nobility showed a desire to speak for the rights of those compatriots who in this particular case could not join them in addressing the throne, and thus to establish justice and legality³⁹.

The district assemblies expressed themselves quite freely on legal and administrative issues, which were almost fully reflected in the collective *Note* – namely, the need to confirm the Lithuanian Statute, introduce in the region governance according to the Institutions in the Provinces of 1775 and Charter to the Nobility, restore the laws "in all their effect, strength and precision," and reinstitute the courts on the basis of the Lithuanian Statute (first and foremost castle courts). A number of requests concerned such questions as election and re-election to noble offices, particularly those of judges,

³⁸ З. Когут, *Коріння ідентичності...*, с. 99.

³⁹ Т. Литвинова, «Словные пужды и желания» дворянства Левобережной Украины на початку XIX ст., «УДЖ», 2005, №2, с. 67–78.

the possibility of resigning for valid reasons for those who held such offices as district marshal, *pidkomoriy*, or *khorunzhy*⁴⁰, the counting of the term of tenure in the position of a court clerk as service with promotion, and more.

It should be noted that the Little Russian nobility had a hard time getting used to the imperial system and to their new duties, including broad custody over the dependent peasants. It was not easy for officials to instill new standards, especially since they were constantly changing. Hence it is probably no coincidence that comments of the region's top administrators on the laziness of the Little Russians initially concerned the nobility in particular, which was in no hurry to part with tradition and switch to the pan-Russian standards of estate-appropriate behavior and communication both with local authorities and with their subjects. This can be seen quite clearly in Aleksei Kurakin's letters to his brother⁴¹. Other Little Russian governors-general, including Nikolai Reprin, also complained to the higher authorities about their privileged subordinates⁴².

The nobility not only quietly resisted, but also used their means of appeal to the authorities. Relations with local administrators became especially strained when the corporation was headed by such major figures as the Poltava provincial marshal Dmytro Troshchynsky, who had experience in statesmanship and behind-the-scenes intrigue, as well as extensive connections. At such times, ministers, senators, and the head of the Committee of Ministers were bombarded with complaints and 'representations' about "the burdening of this unfortunate province" and "arbitrary and unlawful actions" of Yakov Lobanov-Rostovski⁴³. It is no coincidence that, according to the observation of the historian of the Cabinet of Ministers S. Seredonin, the greatest number of conflicts between governors-general and the *dvorianstvo* occurred in Little Russia⁴⁴. In defense of their economic rights, which were based on the ancient guarantees of the Russian monarchs, the nobility of this region repeatedly showed a fair degree of corporate solidarity, pushing governors-general to turn to the central government for support⁴⁵. Sometimes, responding to the 'representations' of the administrators of Little Russia,

⁴⁰ A repertoire of such peculiar elected offices was preserved in Little Russia until the early 1830s.

⁴¹ In 1804, Governor-General Aleksei Kurakin, in a letter from Chernigov, wrote to his brother Aleksandr Kurakin, a prominent figure of that era, about the local nobles: "Every order requires obedience and time: as for the first, we do not understand it yet, and the second is so difficult, thanks to the *lazy disposition of the Ukrainians* [italics ours - O. Zh., T. L.], that it seems unbearable before one gets used to it" (see: *Письма генерал-губернатора Князя А.Б. Куракина из Малороссии*, [w:] *Труды Полтавской архивной комиссии* (далі: *Труды ПАК*), 1903, вып. 6, ч. 1, с. 71).

⁴² РДИА, ф. 971, оп. 1, спр. 10; ф. 1035, оп. 1, спр. 67.

⁴³ *Письма Д.П. Трошинского, 1798 – 1813, М.П. Миклашевскому, «КС»*, 1890, Апрель, Документы, известия и заметки, с. 151–152.

⁴⁴ С. Середонин, *Исторический обзор деятельности Комитета министров*, Санкт-Петербург 1902, т. 2, ч. 2., с. 249.

⁴⁵ For instance, when N. Reprin rebuked the nobility of the districts along the border with Great Russia for alcohol smuggling, the result was a speech by the Hlukhiv landowner D. Kochubey to the district nobility on 10 December 1828 and a collective resolution of the meeting appealing to royal charters, including the articles of 1654, and invoking the rights and liberties of the Little Russian *shliakhta* (see: *Російський державний історичний архів*, ф. 1035, оп. 1, спр. 10, арк. 15–16 зв., 25–27). These alcohol-related episodes have been touched upon in the literature (see: И. Павловский, *Кн. Репнин в его отношениях к дворянству из-за винной монополии и Д.В. Кочубей* [w:] *Труды ПАК*, 1907, вып. 4, с. 210–220; В. Шандра, *Малоросійське генерал-губернаторство, 1802–1856: функції, структура, архів*. Київ, 2001, с. 122–123).

the monarch himself had to intervene, strictly reminding the nobility of the need to be an example of stately order⁴⁶.

One of the prominent leaders of the Little Russian elite at the turn of the 19th century was the son of Hryhoriy Poletyka, Vasyl (1765-1845), who drew on his father's manuscript writings and the *Rights* of 1768, demonstrating a deep continuity of views. In close partnership with several comrades in spirit (Andriyan Chepa, Mykola Storozhenko, Vasyl Charnysh, Fedir Tumansky, Tymofiy Kalynsky, Roman Markovych, and others), he protested against the decision of the Department of Heraldry to deny nobility to the descendants of lower Cossack officers. In this yet another infringement on the traditional rights, the nobles saw not so much a violation of their personal interests as an insult to 'patriotic feeling'. Not recognizing the rights of Little Russia's lower officer ranks, the Department of Heraldry insulted the memory of the 'leaders of the nation' and spurned their victorious exploits for the Fatherland and the throne⁴⁷.

Importantly, it was the leading representatives of the elite, long and unambiguously ennobled, that came to the defense of their 'lesser brothers', which rules out corporate egoism on their part. The opposition was led by provincial and district marshals of the nobility, who became the addressees of swarms of 'notes' and 'opinions' penned by local intellectuals. In these documents, the legitimacy of the 'ancient rights and liberties' of the Little Russian knighthood and *shliakhta* was argued with numerous examples and extensive legal and historical excursuses. This civic movement, the peak of which fell on the years 1805 to 1810, was able to attract the sympathies of the imperial administration to its side, including the governors-general Kurakin, Lobanov-Rostovski, and Repnin.

Citing the authority of H. Poletyka and significance of his legacy, Andriyan Chepa offered in his *Note on the Benefits of the Little Russian Ranks* a historical disquisition proving the precedence of Little Russia by the fact that it was "the ancestral homeland of all-Russian monarchs", to "the foot of [whose] throne" the Little Russian estates voluntarily "threw" their land. Such self-identification, quite free of provincialism, stemmed from the conviction that the roots of the Fatherland's political distinctiveness went back to the times of the Grand Principality of Kyiv, and the ancestors of the Little Russian people were the ancient Rus'. Chepa also considered it as a great merit of Little Russia that "under the alien yoke it preserved since the times of ancient Russian rule the Orthodox faith, Russian language..., ancient rights and statutes, custom and division of the conditions of the people"⁴⁸.

The vivid and stirring patriotic displays of the generation of the 'children' drew on the ideological heritage of the 1760s. And although administrative and political autonomy was already out of the question, awareness of the exceptional position of their Fatherland determined the tenor of this generation's thought and action. Their motto was the words of V. Poletyka from a letter to Chepa written on 2 February 1810:

⁴⁶ В. Шандра, *Малоросійське генерал-губернаторство...*, с. 116.

⁴⁷ *Записка о начале, происхождении, и достоинстве Малороссийского дворянства, писанная маршалом Роменского повета Василием Полетикою, «КС», 1893, январь, приложение, с. 1-14.*

⁴⁸ *Записка о преимуществах чинов Малороссийских. Сочинена статским советником Адрианом Чепю 1809 года, февраля 18 дня, «КС», 1897, приложение, с. 25.*

“How pleasant it is to labor for the glory and good of the fatherland!”⁴⁹. The ‘children’ were also confident that there would be ‘grandchildren’:

In this field, the memory of our former patriots, unforgettable forever, will be revived. Happy will we be if we see new ones, defending with the same zeal the rights, benefits, liberties, and freedoms of their fatherland. And conversely, we must avert our eyes with disgust from pernicious traitors of the fatherland, harmful self-lovers⁵⁰.

The intensity of the writings of Little Russian intellectuals did not at all mean unanimity of views, because a keen search was taking place for optimal ways to integrate the Fatherland into the imperial structures while definitively preserving its distinctive features in order to increase “the honor of our nation”⁵¹. Zenon Kohut, however, reduced the entire social strain of the era to two competing positions: the ‘assimilationists’ and the ‘traditionalists’⁵², which dichotomy, thanks to the historian’s reputation, has been reproduced again and again by foreign and Ukrainian authors.

We have already had occasions to write about the vulnerability of this scheme and the tentative nature and fuzziness of these concepts, which have given rise to other, similar ones – ‘restorers’ and ‘modernists’⁵³. Let us immediately note that such labels keep out of our grasp all the complexity and multidirectionality of the social and ideological developments with which we are trying to engage. They will not help us understand, for example, why Chepa, whose reputation as an ‘autonomist’ has been firmly established in historiography for a long time, in a letter to Vasyl Anastasevych from 28 August 1816 characterized the hetmans’ rule as ‘the most hellish’, and the hetmans themselves as ‘unclean despots’. He wrote that “Little Russia, if it possesses any distinguishing benefits serving towards the good of it, possesses them by the grace of the Russian Sovereigns”⁵⁴.

Skeptical attitude towards the ‘hetmans’ rule’, seen as a symbol of the usurpation of power, had not been something exceptional among the Little Russian elite before. A case in point is the refusal of the general *starshyna*, higher clergy, and even some close relatives of Kyrylo Rozumovsky to sign a petition for hereditary hetmanship⁵⁵. H. Poletyka, in his petition to Empress Elizaveta Petrovna in 1760, summarizing his personal conflict with Hetman Rozumovsky, also wrote about the latter’s usurpation

⁴⁹ В. Горленко, *Из истории южнорусского общества начала XIX века (Письма В.И. Чарныша, А.И. Чети, В.Г. Полетики и заметки к ним)*, «КС», 1893, № 1, с. 55–57.

⁵⁰ *Ibidem*. He is probably speaking here of the anonymous author of the early 19th-century *Observations Pertaining to Little Russia*.

⁵¹ *Ibidem*.

⁵² З. Когут, *Російський централізм...*, с. 226.

⁵³ О. Журба, *Региональное историописание второй половины XVIII – первой половины XIX вв. в плену «украинского национального возрождения» (проблемы украинской исторической и историографической культуры)*, [w:] *Мир историка*, 2013, вып. 8, с. 124–165; Т. Литвинова, «Помещиць правда»..., с. 25.

⁵⁴ О. Журба, «Представьте Вы себе, какой зверь был гетман! Это были пренечистивые деспоты!» (з листа свідомого українського патріота, автономіста та традиціоналіста початку XIX століття), [w:] *ДІАЗ*, 2009, вип. 3, с. 202–204.

⁵⁵ З. Когут, *Російський централізм...*, с. 88.

of power⁵⁶. But most importantly, this expert in law consistently advocated separating military and civilian power on the basis of the Lithuanian Statute and establishing the principles of collective *sejm* government.

Accustomed to the repeated abolition of the office of hetman during the 18th century, the region's elite calmly reacted to yet another such act in 1764 and, unlike some historians⁵⁷, did not see it as the fatal blow to the entire autonomous system of the Hetmanate lands. The latter maintained their administrative-territorial and military organization until the beginning of the 1780s, their legal autonomy until the 1840s, and their vivid ideological, cultural, and social distinctiveness until the early 20th century. Hence it was not the idea of the preservation/restoration of the hetmans' rule, but that of the consolidation and systematization of the 'ancient rights and liberties of our nation' that defined the actual Little Russian agenda until the mid-19th century.

The first literary attempts in the Little Russian/Ukrainian language made in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, which, indeed, at the turn of the 1840s began to be retrospectively perceived as a fact of the formation of an independent language and thus caused intellectual discussion, were also seen by the contemporaries in more than one way. We think it would not be much of an exaggeration to suppose that Ivan Kotliarevsky learned with some surprise in the late 1830s from the generation of the 'grandchildren' about his status as the founder of the modern Ukrainian language and literature. At the same time, the early 19th-century literary exercises in the people's language were of decisive importance for the formation within the framework of the pre-modern nation of new criteria for defining one's Fatherland – specifically the ethno-national, including linguistic, particularities.

The optics of the 'Ukrainian national revival' has also determined the representation of the historiographical process in the 'Ukrainian lands' as a coherent, continuous, and linear development of (certainly) Ukrainian historical thought since ancient times⁵⁸. Here we may recall the remark of the French historian Vincent Robert:

What right do we have to believe that the people of the 19th century could be wrong? Of course, it is easy for historians who are aware of the subsequent course of events to demonstrate retrospective insight and emphasize the significance of a detail that escaped the attention of contemporaries, but contains a foreshadowing of the future. ...If they [contemporaries – O. Zh., T. L.] attached primary importance to a certain event, we must listen to them. If they did so, it means that they probably had reasons for it, formulated openly or latently. It remains for us to understand what these reasons were⁵⁹.

⁵⁶ V. V. Tarnovsky Chernihiv Museum of History, Ал. 502/15/60.

⁵⁷ Я. Лазарев, *Идейное поле «национального» интеллектуала имперского периода: взгляды Г.А. Полетики (1725–1784) на «украинскую государственность»*, [w:] *Slověne=Словъне*, 2016, № 1, с. 186.

⁵⁸ І. Колесник, *Українська історіографія (XVIII – початок XX століття)*, Київ 2000; В. Кравченко, *Нариси з української історіографії епохи національного Відродження (друга половина XVIII – середина XIX ст.)*, Харків 1996; Я. Калакура, *Українська історіографія*, Київ 2012.

⁵⁹ В. Робер, *Время банкетов: политика и символика одного поколения (1818–1848)*, Москва 2019, с. 53–54.

This kind of situational approach, which stresses not what a phenomenon would become in many decades, but what it was for the contemporaries, appeals to us greatly.

The inertia set by Ukrainian historiography also affects the theories of Russian authors, who date the origins of the Ukrainian nation and Ukrainian nation-building to the 1760s⁶⁰ – while in fact awareness of ethno-national unity becomes evident within the tight coterie of the Cyril-Methodians only in the mid-19th century. How long and difficult the maturation of the concept of the ‘Ukrainian nation’ eventually turned out to be is evident from the marginal role of this intellectual product until the revolution of 1917, when “Ukrainian intellectuals still disagreed about where exactly the borders of ‘Ukraine’ were”⁶¹.

At the same time, what comes through strongly in the early 19th-century writings of Left-Bank intellectuals is that this group perceived their homeland as unique and distinct from the surrounding, including ethnic Ukrainian, regions and had a clear understanding of its territorial boundaries. These were the building blocks of administrative-territorial patriotism as the most important feature of this national organism. Thus it is probably no coincidence that the term ‘Little Russian nation’ continued to be used alongside the term ‘Little Russian people’ in the first half of the 19th century. Politically, this ‘nation’ positioned itself as subject to the Russian monarch, demanding in return protection and support of its exclusive national space.

The pre-modern Little Russian nation as a political and political-legal reality gradually dissolved towards the early 1840s. However, the *longue durée* inertia of mental structures and stereotypes ensured its persistence and vitality, filling it with new substance – a search for a new, ethnic fatherland, the expanse of which turned out to be much broader than the administrative and territorial boundaries of the former Hetmanate.

Accordingly, if we are to talk about a gap in Ukrainian nation-building, we should not look for it in the activities of H. Poletyka, accusing him of not doing what he could not and did not intend to do – develop a new anti-imperial political language and ideals of an ‘independent Ukrainian Cossack state’⁶². Rather, we should turn to the generation of his ‘grandchildren’. It was they who, drawing on the same material, formulated two competing modern national projects – Little Russian, which was inscribed into the system of imperial loyalty and grew organically on the shoulders of the ‘grandfathers and fathers’, and Ukrainian, which appropriated and redefined the history, ideas, and cultural legacy of the ‘old’ elite but denied it the pride of ‘authorship’ and instead charged it with national betrayal.

Naturally, combinations of identities generated specificities of regional self-definition, which was complicated by the search for not only new social, but also national identification amidst a vortex of numerous competing pre-modern and modern projects. This was not least due to internal Ukrainian integration, as well as, in the observation of Mark von Hagen⁶³, the extraordinary cultural and political permeability of the Ukrainian space.

⁶⁰ Я. Лазарев, *Идейное поле «национального» интеллектуала...*

⁶¹ S. Velichenko, *The Issue of Russian Colonialism in Ukrainian Thought. Dependency Identity and Development*, «Ab Imperio», 2002, № 1, с. 323–367.

⁶² Я. Лазарев, *Идейное поле «национального» интеллектуала...*, с. 199.

⁶³ М. Хаген, *Имеет ли Украина историю?*, «Ab Imperio», 2000, № 1, с. 66.

The third generation of Left-Bank intellectuals is saliently represented by two exact contemporaries who did much to expand and change the correlation between the imperial and national identities. Both Panteleimon Kulish (1819-1897) and Hryhoriy Galagan (1819-1888) associated themselves no longer with the territorially-defined Old Little Russia, but instead with the ethnic Motherland, boldly crossing the boundaries of the traditional Hetmanate in their imagination.

The acts and texts of Hryhoriy Galagan⁶⁴ represent the birth of a new Little Russian identity, stemming not only from the administrative-territorial patriotism of the fathers and grandfathers, but also from the awareness, fostered by the literature of Romanticism, of the unity of a large ethnic mass whose borders, if not yet definitively established, were to be found far outside the Hetmanate⁶⁵. At the same time, like his predecessors, Galagan inextricably wove the local ethnic Little Russia into the political body of the empire, fervently defending the distinctive socio-economic and spiritual/cultural features of the region.

The writings and endeavors of Panteleimon Kulish, grounded in the same criteria and arguments, testify to the emergence of the project of a *sui generis* Ukrainian ethnolinguistic community, whose history and future were removed beyond the hierarchies of imperial identity and whose past and present began to be represented in the victimizing categories of 'lost time'.

This intellectual rupture, which occurred in the late 1840s and 1850s, marked the emergence of fiercely competing projects, which, in addition to the old Little Russian patriotism, gave rise to a complex, confusing, and highly situational latticework of local identities, generating a sharp ideological and social struggle for priority and supporters. It seems a significant simplification to portray this tense intellectual situation as a monolithic struggle against colonial oppression, or as discussions among Kulish's successors⁶⁶.

To a large extent, the tension in question derived from the special status of the region 'responsible' for the Ukrainian national project within the empire. And here it is difficult to disagree with the Japanese Russianist Kimitaka Matsuzato, who considered Left-Bank Ukraine-Little Russia as one of the three macro-regions that formed the territorial core of the Russian Empire and had the status of 'internal provinces'. Notably, the 'core status' within the empire, in the historian's view, did not mean a loss of historical and ethnic distinctiveness, since the Russian Empire was a kind of coalition state of three macro-regions⁶⁷. It is no accident that the social elite of the Left Bank (which did not experience systematic discomfort until at least the mid-19th century) had neither an inferiority complex nor any special problems fitting into the system of imperial identity. Problems, in fact, arose specifically in connection with the choice of a *national* identity. The

⁶⁴ «Я хочу из моих писем к тебе сделать свой журнал...»: письма Григория Галагана к жене. Упоряд. М. Будзар, Є. Ковальов, Київ 2017; «Ми виїхали з Сокиринців...»: травелогі родини Галаганів: документальна монографія. Упоряд. М. Будзар, Є. Ковальов, Київ 2019, 516 с.; Григорій Галаган. Журнал (1836-1841). Упоряд. М. Будзар, Є. Ковальов, Київ 2020.

⁶⁵ О. Журба, Т. Литвинова, *Інтеграційний проєкт Г. Галагана середини ХІХ ст.*, «УДЖ», 2022, № 3, с. 194-204.

⁶⁶ І. Гирич, *Українські інтелектуали і політична окремішність (середина ХІХ – початок ХХ ст.)*, Київ 2014.

⁶⁷ К. Мацузато, *Ядро или периферия империи? Генерал-губернаторство и малороссийская идентичность*, [w:] *Український гуманітарний огляд*, 2002, вип. 7, с. 76-78.

empire, on the other hand, was for them a shared space, in the creation of which they had taken active part throughout its history, sometimes setting the tone, and whose resource they had been using to defend national interests and particularities. Moreover, rather than limiting these national interests to the protection of their own privileges and support for cultural projects, the social elite from H. Poletyka to Galagan actively championed the rights of other social groups, including the peasantry.

Thus, the widespread populist stereotypes notwithstanding, the social elite of Left-Bank Ukraine maintained until the end of the 19th century its leadership and responsibility in defense of national rights, manifest not only in the sponsoring of the projects of Taras Shevchenko, Kulish, and others, but also in the upholding of the socio-economic and public interests of the region as a whole. The acquired imperial identity did not preclude an awareness of national individuality but, on the contrary, could strengthen it. The Little Russian elite remembered this well. And, as one of the principal 'shareholders' of the empire, it never tired of reminding others about this, which is worth keeping in mind as we strive for the normalization of the study of the Ukrainian 19th century.

REFERENCES

Archival sources:

Institut rukopisu Nacional'noi biblioteki Ukraïni NAN Ukraïni im. V.I. Vernads'kogo, f. VIII. Rosijs'kij deržavnij istoričnij arhiv, f. 971; 1035.
Černigivs'kij istoričnij muzej im. V.V. Tarnovs'kogo. Al. 502/15/60.

Published Sources:

«Mi viihali z Sokirinciv...»: *travelogi rodini Galaganiv: dokumental'na monografiâ*. Uporâd. M. Budzar, Ć. Koval'ov, Kïiv 2019, 516 s.
«Ya hoĉu iz moih pisem k tebe sdelat' svoj žurnal...»: *pis'ma Grigoriâ Galagana k žene*, uporâd. M. Budzar, Ć. Koval'ov, Kïiv 2017, 136 s.
Obzor zanâtij Bol'shogo Sobraniâ s 7 aprilâ po 9 serntâbrâ 1768 goda, [in:] *Sbornik Russkogo istoričeskogo obšestva*, 1881, t. 32, s. 3–342.
Pis'ma D.P. Trošinskogo, 1798 – 1813, M.P. Miklaševskomu, «Kievskâ starina», 1890, april', dokumenty, izvestiâ i zametki, s. 151–152.
Pis'ma general-gubernatora Knâzâ A.B. Kurakina iz Malorossii, [in:] *Trudy Poltavskoj arhivnoj komissii*, 1903, vyp. 6, ĉ. 1, s. 41–75.
Prošenie malorossijskogo šlahetstva i staršiny, vmeste s getmanom, o vozstanovlenii raznyh starinnyh prav Malorossii, podannoĉ Ekaterina II v 1764 godu, «Kievskâ starina», 1883, iŭn', s. 317–345.
Vozraženie deputata Grigoriâ Poletiki, [w:] *Čteniâ v Obšestve istorii i drevnostej rossijskikh*, 1858, kn. 3, smes', s. 23–54.
Zapiska o naĉale, proishoždenii, i dostoinstve Malorossijskogo dvorânstva, pisannaâ maršalom Romenskogo poveta Vasiliem Poletikoŭ, «Kievskâ starina», 1893, ânvar', priloženie, s. 1–14.
Zapiska o preimušestvah ĉinov Malorossijskikh. Soĉinena statskim sovetnikom Adrianom Ćepoŭ 1809 goda, fevralâ 18 dnâ, «Kievskâ starina», 1897, priloženie, s. 23–39.

Studies:

Adadurov V., *Narodžennâ odnogo istoričnogo mifu: problema «Napoleon i Ukraïna» u visovitlenni Il'ka Boršaka*, «Ukraïna moderna», 2005, vip. 9, s. 212–236.
Arkuša O., Kondratûk K., Mudrij M., Suhij O., *Ćas narodiv. Istorii Ukraïni HIH stolittâ*, L'viv 2016.

- Avseenko V., *Malorossiâ v 1767 g. Èpizod iz istorii HVIII st. Po neizdannym istočnikam*, Kiev 1864.
- Bilenky S., *Laboratory of Modernity: Ukraine between Empire and Nation, 1772–1914*, Montreal 2023.
- Eighteenth-Century Ukraine: New Perspectives on Social, Cultural, and Intellectual History*, eds. Z. Kohut, V. Sklokin, F. Sysyn, Montreal 2023.
- Gal' B., *Geokoncept «Malorossiâ» na mental'nyh kartah HVIII – pervoj poloviny HIH v.*, [w:] *Imâ naroda. Ukraina i ee naselenie v oficial'nyh i naučnyh terminah, publicistike i literature. Sb. Statej*, Moskva 2016, s. 8–28.
- Girič I., *Ukraïns'ki intelektuali i politična okremišnist' (seredina XIX – počatok XX st.)*, Kïiv 2014.
- Gorlenko V., *Iz istorii ũžnorusskogo obšestva načala HIH veka (Pis'ma V.I. Čarnyša, A.I. Čepy, V.G. Poletiki i zametki k nim)*, «Kievskâ starina», 1893, № 1, s. 55–57.
- Gricak Â., *Naris istorii Ukraïni: Formuvannâ modernoi Ukraïns'koï nacii HIH – HH st.*, Kïiv 2019.
- Gricak Â., *Spasti sebe i spasti cile lûdstvo*: <https://zbruc.eu/node/115430?fbclid=IwAR104s-anWGodDLq3INyU0fngzppxf9gdIlg56kZyhsXH9nUnpUOZJTHCebw> [vhid 19.09.2023].
- Grihorij Talaran. Žurnal (1836–1841)*, uporâd., M. Budzar, E. Koval'ov, Kïiv 2020.
- Hagen M., *Imeet li Ukraina istoriï?*, «Ab Imperio», 2000, № 1, s. 51–72.
- Ireland and Ukraine. Studies in Comparative Imperial and National History*, eds: S. Velychenko, J. Ruane, L. Hrynevych, Stuttgart 2022.
- Kalakura Â., *Ukraïns'ka istoriografiâ*, Kïiv 2012.
- Kogut Z., *Rosijs'kij centralizm i Ukraïns'ka avtonomiâ. Likvidaciâ Get'manšini 1760–1830*, Kïiv 1996.
- Kogut Z., *Rozvitok malorosijs'koï samosvidomosti i Ukraïns'ke nacional'ne budivnictvo*, [w:] Z. Kogut, *Korinnâ identičnosti. Studii z rann'omodernoï ta modernoi istorii Ukraïni*, Kïiv 2004, s. 80–101.
- Kolesnik I., *Ukraïns'ka istoriografiâ (XVIII – počatok XX stolittâ)*, Kïiv 2000.
- Kravčenko V., *Narisi z Ukraïns'koï istoriografii epohi nacional'nogo Vidrodžennâ (druga polovina XVIII – seredina XIX st.)*, Kharkiv 1996.
- Latkin V., *Zakonodatel'nye komissii v Rossii, Sankt-Peterburg 1887*, t. 1.
- Lazarev Â., *Idejnoe pole «nacional'nogo» intelektualna imperskogo perioda: vzglâdy G.A. Poletiki (1725–1784) na «Ukraïnskuû gosudarstvennost'»*, «Slovène=Slověne», 2016, № 1, s. 184–202.
- Litvinova T., «Pomišic'ka pravda». *Dvorânstvo Livoberežnoi Ukraïni ta selâns'ke pitannâ naprikinci XVIII – v peršij polovini XIX st. (ideologičnij aspekt)*, Dnipropetrovs'k 2011.
- Litvinova T., «Progresivnij konservatizm» – vipadkove slovospolučennâ, či fakt Ukraïns'koï suspil'noi dumki drugoi polovini XVIII st., [w:] *Dnipropetrovs'kij istoriko-arheografičnij zbirnik*, 1997, vip. 1, s. 372–385.
- Litvinova T., «Soslovnye nuždy i želaniâ» *dvorânstva Livoberežnoi Ukraïni na počatku XIX st.*, «Ukraïns'kij istoričnij žurnal», 2005, № 2, s. 67–78.
- Litvinova T., G.A. Poletika: «publičnij intelektual» *vtoroj poloviny XVIII v.*, «Vestnik Omskogo universiteta. Istoričeskie nauki», 2015, № 2(6), s. 79–86.
- Litvinova T., *Maloross v rossijskom kul'turno-istoriografičeskom prostranstve vtoroj poloviny XVIII v.*, [w:] *Dnipropetrovs'kij istoriko-arheografičnij zbirnik*, 2001, vip. 2, s. 28–64.
- Macuzato K., *Âdro ili periferiâ imperii? General-gubernatorstvo i malorossijskâ identičnost' [in:] Ukraïns'kij humanitarnij oğlâd*, 2002, vip. 7, s. 69–82.
- Melnik A., Tairova-Yakovleva T., *Hryhorii Poletyka's Introduction of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy Educational Methods in the Russian Empire*, «Kyiv-Mohyla Humanities Journal», 2019, № 6, p. 115–126.
- Mihajlovs'kij V., *Naši koroli. Volodari ta dinastii v istorii Ukraïni (1340–1795)*, Kïiv 2023.
- Miller A., *Maloross*, [in:] «Ponâtiâ o Rossii»: *K semantike imperskogo perioda*, Moskva 2012, s. 392–443.

- Miller D., *Očerki iz istorii i ûrîdičeskogo byta staroj Malorossii. Sudy zemskie, grodskie i podkomorskie v HVIII v.*, [in:] *Sbornik Har'kovskogo Istoriko-filologičeskogo obšestva*, 1896, t. 8, s. 6–233.
- Ogloblin O., *Problema shemi istorii Ukraïni 19–20 stolittâ (do 1917 roku)*, «Ukraïns'kij istorik», 1971, № 1/2, s. 5–16.
- Pavlovskij I., *Kn. Repnin v ego otnošeníâh k dvorânstvu iz-za vinnoj monopolii i D.V. Kočubej*, [w:] *Trudy Poltavskoj arhivnoj komissii*, 1907, vyp. 4, s. 210–220.
- Pirig R., *Get'manat Pavla Skoropads'kogo: kompleks malorosijstva pravlâčoi eliti*, «Ukraïns'kij istoričnij žurnal», 2023, № 4, s. 59–84.
- Plohij S., *Kozac'kij mijf. Istoriâ ta naciotvorennâ v epohu imperij*, Kiïv 2013.
- Poletika G., *Mnenie o načitannom proekte pravam blagorodnyh*, [w:] *Sbornik Russkogo istoričeskogo obšestva*, 1882, t. 36, s. 346–356.
- Reent O., *Ukraïna v impers'ku dobu (XIX – počatok XX stolittâ)*, Kiïv 2016.
- Rober V., *Vremâ banketov: politika i simvolika odnogo pokoleniâ (1818–1848)*, Moskva 2019.
- Rudnev D., G.A. *Poletika i izdatel'skaâ deâtel'nost' Morskogo kadetskogo korpusa v 1760–1770-e gg.*, [w:] *Vtorye Luppovskie čteniâ*, Moskva 2006, s. 42–72.
- Rudnev D., Grigorij Andreeevič Poletika i knižnaâ kul'tura XVIII veka [in:] *Literaturnaâ kul'tura Rossii XVIII veka*, Sankt-Peterburg 2008, vyp. 2, s. 53–64.
- Šandra V., Arkuša O., *Ukraïna v XIX st.: lûdnist' ta imperii*, Kiïv 2022.
- Šandra V., *Malorosij'ske general-gubernatorstvo, 1802–1856: funkciï, struktura, arhiv*, Kiïv 2001.
- Seredonin S., *Istoričeskij obzor deâtel'nosti Komiteta ministrov*, Sankt-Peterburg 1902, t. 2, č. 2.
- Shid-Zahid: istoriko-kul'turoloģičnij zbirnik*, Kharkiv 2001, vip.4: *Rossia et Britania: imperii ta nacii na Ukraïnah Ėvropi*, 276 s.
- Sklokin V., *Či isnuvalo Ukraïns'ke Prosvitnictvo? Kil'ka mirkuvan' šodo nezaveršenoï istoriografičnoï diskusii*, «Kiïvs'ka Akademiâ», 2015, № 12, s. 146–159.
- Starčenko N., *Musimo govorit' pro Ukraïns'ku Rič Pospolitu*, «Lokal'na istoriâ», 2021, № 9, s. 74–81.
- Svitlenko C., *Ukraïns'ke XIX stolittâ: etnonacional'ni, intelektual'ni ta istoriosofs'ki konteksti*, Dnipro 2018.
- Terešenko Ū., *Dovge XIX stolittâ: sprotiv asimilâcii*, Kiïv 2022.
- Toločko A., *Kievskâ Rus' i Malorosiâ v XIX veke*, Kiev 2012.
- Vasilenko M., G.N. *Teplov i jogo «Zapiska o neporâdkah v Malorossii»*, [w:] *Zapiski Ukraïns'kogo naukovogo Tovaristva v Kievi*, 1911, kn. 2, s. 17–41.
- Velichenko S., *The Issue of Russian Colonialism in Ukrainian Thought. Dependency Identity and Development*, «Ab Imperio», 2002, № 1, c. 323–367.
- Yakovenko N., *Vibir imeni versus vibir šlâhu: nazvi Ukraïns'koï teritorii miž kincem XVI – kincem XVII st.*, [in:] Yakovenko N., *Dzerkala identičnostej. Doslidžennâ z istorii uâvlen' ta idej v Ukraïni XVI – počatku XVIII st.* Kiïv 2012, s. 9–43.
- Žurba O., «*Nacional'ne*» ta «*regional'ne*» u modernih reprezentaciâh istorii Ukraïns'kogo istoriopisannâ, [in:] *Ukraïns'kij gumanitarnij oĝlâd*, 2013, vip. 18, s. 9–50.
- Žurba O., «*Predstav'te Vy sebe, kakoj zver' byl getman! Ėto byli prenečistivye despoty!*» (z lista sovidomogo Ukraïns'kogo patriota, avtonomista ta tradicionalista počatku XIX stolittâ), [in:] *Dnipropetrovs'kij istoriko-arheografičnij zbirnik*, 2009, vip. 3, s. 161–220.
- Žurba O., «*Ukraïns'ki» nacional'ni proekti dovogo XIX st. v impers'komu prostori*, [in:] *Istoriâ ta istoriografiiâ v Ėvropi*, Kiïv 2019, vip. 6, s. 62–69.
- Žurba O., Litvinova T., *Getmanšina v predstavleniâh Ukraïnskoj intelektual'noj ělity vtoroj poloviny XVIII – serediny XIX v. Čast' 1*, «Dialog so vremenem», 2020, vip. 73, s. 112–126.
- Žurba O., Litvinova T., *Getmanšina v predstavleniâh Ukraïnskoj intelektual'noj ělity vtoroj poloviny XVIII – serediny XIX v. Čast' 2. Novye obrazy Otčizny*, «Dialog so vremenem», 2021, vip.

75, s. 335–345.

Žurba O., Litvinova T., *Narrativizaciâ ukraïnskogo prošlogo v konce HII – načale HHI veka: vozmožno li preodolenie?*, [in:] *Vestnik Permskogo universiteta. Istorîâ*, 2020, № 3, s. 27–41.

Žurba O., Litvinova T., *Interracijnij projekt G. Ġalarana seredini XIX st.*, «Ukraïns'kij istoričnij žurnal», 2022, № 3, s. 194–204.

Žurba O., *Ponâtie «Malorossiâ» i nacional'nye proekty XVIII – XIX veka*, [in:] *B'lgarska ukrainistika: almanah*, 2020, № 9, s. 199–209.

Žurba O., *Problemi istoriografičnogo rajonuvannâ ta pošuki regional'nih identiċnostej*, [in:] *Regional'na istorîâ Ukraïni*, Kïïv 2008, vip. 2, s. 47–58.

Žurba O., *Regional'noe istoriopisanie vtoroj poloviny XVIII – pervoj poloviny XIX vv. v plenu «ukraïnskogo nacional'nogo vrozċdeniâ» (problemy ukraïnskoj istoričeskoj i istoriografičeskoj kul'tury)*, [in:] *Mir istorika*, 2013, vyp. 8, s. 124–165.

Ėkel'ċik S., *Istorîâ Ukraïni. Stanovlennâ modernoi nacii*, Kïïv 2011.

Impers'ki identiċnosti v ukraïns'kij istorii XVIII – peršoi polovini XIX st., red. V. Adadurov, V. Sklokin, L'viv 2020.

